


IDENTITY AND ACTIVISM **BY BLAS F. OPLE** FILIPINO CULTURAL
ROOTS AND FOREIGN INFLUENCES **BY CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL**
CAUTIONARY NOTES ON STUDENTS **BY ADRIAN CRISTOBAL**
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THE POPULATION CHALLENGE **BY CONRADO LORENZO**
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THE MYTH OF CRISIS PEACE AND ORDER **BY EFREN PLANA**

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THE QUARTERLY

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Social Activism is merely the name we give to a movement
for political and social regeneration

By ELAS F. OPLE

IDENTITY AND ACTIVISM

The historian Arnold Toynbee, assessing the peoples of Southeast Asia, praised the Filipinos for their vibrant disposition and gave them credit for a truly variegated culture. The many-colored influences from the East and the West stand out in the strands of Philippine history and culture like the hues of some of our undersea coral gardens.

But it is indeed this very diversity that makes sensitive Filipinos uneasy about themselves. What is called the search for a Filipino identity is in reality the apprehension of an urgent political, social and moral need to pull together all these influences and have them subsumed in a total national identity brought about by the integrating will of the Filipinos themselves.

The emergence of the Filipinos to national independence in 1946 seemed to many as too facile an event. It seemed almost an anti-climax to the struggle for independence which had previously reached a brief culmination in the 1898 Malolos Republic. Reflecting the growing mood of the nation for its own authentic identity, the government found it necessary some years ago to change the date of our national day from July 4 to June 12—the precise date in 1898 when the leaders of the Philippine Revolution, led by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, proclaimed the First Republic in Kawit, Cavite just eight months before the outbreak of the Philippine-American war.

Behind this decision was a tacit feeling that the independence won by the sacrifice of blood and treasure was preferable to one given on a silver platter by a benevolent master. The Republic of 1898 by this reasoning was an authentic act of will by the Filipino people. The independence of July 4, 1946, while no one doubted its legitimacy, had to be thought of as a grant for which the people, in their innermost feelings, could not take credit, lacking the romance of sacrifice, dedication and perhaps reinforcing traumatic experiences.

This political uneasiness has lately developed into a popular demand for a Constitutional Convention, to ensure that the political life of the nation would be purged of vestigial influences from colonial times. The present Constitution, no matter how sound and adequate, was after all written within the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Law that laid down the terms for Philippine independence before the war, and the basic law of the country was subject ultimately to the approval or disapproval of an outside power. There was a widely-held suspicion, too, that the democratic institutions established in the Constitution had merely been grafted on to basically unchanged feudal infra-structures matched by a vague hope that the corrective measures lay in the making of a new and more authentic Filipino constitution.



This rich historical legacy of the Filipinos has to be placed in a framework ordained by the will of the Filipinos themselves before the legacy can be definitely stamped as Filipino. Thus, this desire for complete self-expression beyond the inherited framework and beyond the accidents of history clearly actuates the new forces clamoring to be heard in Philippine society. This is equally strong and imperative in the political as well as the social, economic, cultural and other fields.

This is certainly one useful perspective to the current social activism in the Philippines, marked by unceasing demonstrations of students, workers, peasants, artists and intellectuals. The alienating impact of an impersonal industrial technology merely aggravates a situation where every one gropes for a satisfactory personal and national identity, a meaning to life that can be found only in effective and authentic self-expression.

This intense need underlies the movement known as Filipino Nationalism, which may be regarded as a synonym to social activism. The latter, in turn, is a general rubric under which may be found diverse factions actually contemptuous of each other, ranging from the far left to the far right. But whatever factional differences may exist, the national list movement represents the political and social articulation of the people's need for a satisfactory identity and genuine self-determination.

The merger of political and social perspectives has produced, it seems, a sudden illumination.

In his famous work, *The Ruling Class*, Gaetano Mosca spoke of the need by ruling classes to create a "political formula" to make their exploitation of the people palatable. This is to put an exploitative system on the level of principle; every ideology is to a lesser or fuller extent, a rationalization of the existing order. In the Philippines, the ruling elite avidly seized on democracy as its own political formula. Under a rigid two-party system which ensures the effective exclusion of workers and peasants from the game of power, this formula has worked—not for the people, but for its sponsors.



Jose Rizal put the matter very well in his day when he spoke of palliatives that did not cure the disease, of showy appearances that did not remove the chains from the slaves but merely put a padding to them.

This democratic mask concealing a regressive social, economic and political structure has now been torn off. The government of which it is a reflection suddenly found itself under pitiless scrutiny and criticism. The people have seen through the "political formula" of the elite. In place of the old, misleading democracy they demand real democracy. They want the political, economic and social power more equitably distributed. They seek democracy not only in the political but also in the non-political areas—the social and the economic. They say, now we shall take democracy seriously and compel our society to do the same.

This is right now the most pronounced aspect of the current social activism. To the extent that activism goes to the roots of the problem, to the extent that it challenges the legal postulates of the status quo, then it is radical and it is revolutionary. Almost without exception, the students are calling for sweeping change—deep and basic structural changes. The workers' movement, so far, is meliorist rather than revolutionary in comparison; it concentrates on the task of legislating a new minimum wage law, without itself being represented in the legislature. An increasingly articulate segment of the workers' movement is of course pressing its demands for more basic

changes and is somewhat contemptuous of such gut issues as the minimum wage which it regards, correctly or wrongly, as mere distractions from the task of revolution.

The radical groups raise the issues of imperialism, feudalism and fascism. They have no patience for small steps, a piece of reform here or another there, but demand an altogether new social and political order. The meliorists or the moderates, on the other hand, are also impatient; they would not wait for ideal conditions before starting the renovation of society; they want action now. The people in general is only deceptively passive. This reminds me of a worker in the United States who, when complimented by a visitor on the lack of unrest in his company, put a finger to his breast and said: "The unrest is here." There is unrest in the hearts of our people arising from dissatisfaction with their lot. But also they want to see the realities of their world catch up with the democratic vision which they have been taught to cherish.

And now, what about the government? There is, at the highest level of government, an exceptional political alertness and sensitivity. President Marcos is, I have said on more than one occasion, the only Head of State in the world who parleys directly with the delegations of the people from the streets, be they workers or peasants or students. The President is definitely one of the country's most impatient men. He desires that the government should wake up from its stupor, should improve its sluggish reflexes in responding to the people's grievances, should show a heart for the people.

When the government does not respond — and I now speak of its multifarious agencies, the whole bureaucracy sprawled from one end of the country to the other—then a credibility gap develops and widens. What is solemnly avowed at the top is instantly denied and contradicted by the actions below.

The test of the President's sincerity seldom rests in his own hands; it rests in the hands of a policeman, a clerk, a functionary somewhere who has it within his power to defeat every policy



and mock every principle professed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, in Central Luzon, the President's policy that civil liberties be respected, in spite of an armed insurgency, is set to naught by an abusive civilian guard. Thus, a worker picketting peacefully or a demonstrator availing himself of the right to peaceful assembly is sometimes arbitrarily arrested by a policeman who considers civil liberties such a tremendous inconvenience to the exercise of his profession. On the other hand, a clerk at the Department of Labor or the Bureau of Lands, or the Land Authority who deliberately stops the release of papers due to a worker or peasant is himself engaged in the great conspiracy to alienate the people from their government.

The most urgent task of a President is to break this conspiracy against the people and against himself in the government. The politicians and the vested interests seem to be themselves the main supporters of this conspiracy in forcing the government to bend its policies to the contour of their selfish desires and interests. No President, however, has shown a firmer will in getting things done in the government, and if any President can succeed in this herculean task of moving the inert governmental machinery, this should be President Marcos. Alone, he cannot do this. With social activism providing him with supporting pressures, giving him the extra levers for initiative and action, he has a reasonable chance of being able to move the government in the direction of the people's interest and welfare.

That is the reason I, for one, believe that social activism is healthy for our society, and beyond being merely healthy, a necessary catalyst for genuine change. The social activists, regardless of their differing platforms, force us to come to terms with realities and allow us to rise above self-deception. Needless to say, the activists like nothing better than to challenge the symbols of authority, from the policeman to the President, from the acolyte to the cardinal. They are asking what lies behind authority; they go back to first principles all over again. And when they do so, they think that they find much of this traditional authority bankrupt of meaning or a denial of what it is supposed to represent in the first place.

Authority, therefore, must justify itself all over again. Increasingly, the people will look for substance rather than shadow, for justice rather than merely law, for sacrifice rather than merely the simulation of it, for acts of love rather than mere professions. The people no longer want to be taken for suckers or fools. They are increasingly suspicious of mere appearances; they want to look at realities.

In psychology, the test of maturity is in the recognition of reality, just as flight from reality often indicates a pathological condition. In this sense, social activism reflects the growing political



maturity of our people. This may be a contradiction, since social activism is most especially associated with the young, who are most often regarded as idealists rather than realists, dreamers rather than doers. But it is precisely they, the youth — disgusted with the dishonesty and hypocrisy that put such a wide gap between democratic theory and practice—that have compelled us to face the realities of our national condition. They are the ones that urge us to go back to first principles, to get down to the roots, to look again at the face of our existence and see whether we like what we see. It is a paradox, but true, that our mature political perceptions should be owed to our own children. They are the ones who saw that the emperor was naked, although their parents, conditioned by the past, insisted that he was fully clothed. Some see the naked emperor as imperialism, feudalism and fascism; others see a decayed and hopeless two-party system which exclude the workers and the peasants from effective participation in government; still others see a closed system of economic oligarchy, owing allegiance to no one except itself.

The only "solution" to social activism is to utilize it positively to bring about the needed changes in our society; to make democracy more alive and real for our people, to compel the government to serve the people rather than merely a few; to lift a little the burden of oppression that has lain on the backs of the poor for hundreds of years.

I prefer to see social activism by workers, peasants and student as a necessary positive force

to renovate and regenerate our social order. The danger lies not in social activism, but in the possibility of its suppression by brute force. A civilian guard is at least ten times more dangerous than a Huk; if only because his abuses will effectively recruit ten more Huks. Social activism is merely the other name for political action by the people, and if they resort to direct mass action the only reason is that the present system effectively excludes them from our conventional political life.

The political bar on the workers and the peasants can be lifted only by unpegging our political democracy from an obsolete two-party system. The opportunity to do this will come in the coming Constitutional Convention. We should not be afraid to face a multiplicity of political parties, each avowing a particular platform. As a matter of fact, the political upsurge of hitherto disenfranchised groups, the workers, the peasants and the youth, already points to the inevitability of a more plural and more democratic society, and therefore a more dynamic one, that is already forming today in the welter of protests and demonstrations.

The government, of course, will profit immensely if it will utilize the social activism of the day as a spur to wake up its moribund elements, to accelerate its own pace in reform and develop-



ment, to demand of its members a higher level of performance and dedication. The ability of the government to respond speedily and adequately to the grievances of the common people is crucial. It will define the extent of social activism in the future; whether it will remain militant but pacific or grow in militancy to revolutionary proportions.

In other words, social activism is merely the name we give to a movement for social, political and social regeneration that will reflect our own deep feelings for self-expression and self-realization. We want to remake our society according to our own ideal vision of themselves, a vision formed out of the sacrifices we have shared, the history that we have lived, the noble impulses of the race.

Social activism is a thunderstorm after a long drought, bringing some fearsome thunderclaps, but also bringing life-giving rain for our society. It should inaugurate in the decade of the Seventies a more exciting, a more plural and a more democratic society, such as what many of us heartily wish to see grow in our country; a democracy that the people will recognize as their own, authentic because it bears the stamp of their own initiative and participation, and therefore one they will cherish and defend with their lives if need be.

The basic temperament, lifestyle, outlooks that make up the culture of our people today were there four centuries ago

By CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL

FILIPINO CULTURAL ROOTS AND FOREIGN INFLUENCES



The Filipino people have a reputation for being, first, cultural hybrids and, second, of very recent date. On the face of things, it seems a well-deserved reputation. Looking at our art, our cities, the behavior of our youth, the fashions among our women, business and government practices, one is indeed tempted to draw that conclusion. A more extensive exploration of the facts, however, shows that it is not so.

The main theses of this paper are that:

1. Filipino culture, in the sense of quality and style of life, of the way of doing things, of attitudes and mainstreams, is many hundreds of years old. The cultural matrix of the modern Filipino was already there at the time of the Spanish *conquista* in the middle of the 16th century and may well have been there for a thousand years before that.

It continues almost completely unchanged, as strong and persistent and vital in the national culture today. The basic temperament, the life style, the outlooks that make up the culture of our people today were already there four centuries ago. "The traits of traditional pre-Spanish heritage continue to form the foundation of contemporary life," writes the Archaeologist Robert Fox, who also cautions us against "underevaluating the strength of the traditional features of Filipino behavior and belief," the beginnings of which pre-date Western contact by hundreds and even thousands of years.

By the 15th century there existed in this archipelago—and this statement is based mainly on archaeological evidence—cultures and societies which were unique and distinct, linguistically, culturally and socially speaking, from the neighboring peoples of Asia. The lineal village generally small, scattered and located near the sea or along the rivers, growing later into large, nucleated communities, with each one forming a political, social and economic entity along a recognizable pattern, was the main feature. The strong family unit as focal point of society, with kinship relationships extended through marriage and leadership and with authority vested on family heads and elders was another. Religious beliefs included a hierarchy of deities who lived in skyworlds or underworlds, the even stronger notion that the dead continued to guide and interact with the living, as well as a host of “environmental spirits” which were good or evil depending upon man’s daily relationships with them. A syllabic script, the structure of communal life, native and imported ceramic art, the behavioral patterns, beliefs and values all set them off as a distinct culture which was Filipino in every sense except in name, for it was not till the late 16th century that this people and this culture would be named after the Spanish King, Philip II. The traditional culture moreover was already a synthesis of three mainstreams, the Malay which in itself was a hybrid, the Chinese mind and Indian art.

2. The Malay temper is the main component of Filipino culture. To understand the Malay is to begin to understand the Filipino.

The Malay is himself a melting pot. In the Malay bloodstream run the strains of the Indians, Persians, Arabs, Thais and, mainly, the Chinese of the Chou period. For the Malays were first heard from in Yunnan in North China; from there they moved southwards, many thousands of years ago, crossing the Asian continent and the land bridges to Indonesia and then, becoming seafarers and spreading far afield to the Philippines and Taiwan. They make up a distinct race with common physical characteristics as well as a common temperament.

The premier Malay characteristic is a certain likeableness that most Westerners describe as charm, which is in turn really a compound of the old-fashioned virtues, faith, hope and charity. The Malay is as trusting as a child, naturally tolerant, forbearing and kind. He laughs a good deal, not the least frequently at himself; and is convinced that tomorrow, if the fates will it, everything will be better. His frequent insolvency is due to an overweening generosity, and if he is usually unwilling to press a point, it is out of a certain largeness of heart. He is brave almost to the point of recklessness and, of course, he is nothing if not eloquent.

The two strongest strains in the Malay character, one might say, are: first, the readiness to adjust to a new situation and second, the desire to be, above all, nice. All through the thousands of years of his recorded history, the Malay has demonstrated this pliability. The long migrations, the painful colonizations, the warm weather and the starchy diet have been offered as explanations. In any case, he has always accepted, perhaps too readily, a new concept or a new master, reconciled it to his old customs and lived with it happily.

The Malay has borrowed intelligently from every possible culture, from the Assyrian-Babylonian, which taught the basically democratic Malay villager the divinity of kings, to the modern West, which has given him secularism and humanism. Malay religion consists of snippets of animism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity sewn into a brilliant patchwork quilt and overlaid with the typical Malay personality of mercurial improvisation.

The Malay respect for “niceness” is even more remarkable. Despite his Catholicism or his devotion to the Koran, the modern legal systems which he has developed and the Western-trained police that patrol his cities, the Malay avoids not so much sin or crime as impropriety. To be nice, agreeable and pleasant, rather than to be virtuous or law-abiding is the general ideal. It is much more important among Malays to present a smiling countenance, to make the seemly, decorous gestures, to speak the cordial words that will signify the delicacy of his feelings, to be gracious and hospitable than, say, to avoid adultery or to pay his taxes. Not for him the flat, sensible, crabbed,



uprightness of other peoples. Frankness is a breach of courtesy and righteousness an eccentricity. Punctuality is a sign of coarseness and too obtrusive a virtue is setting oneself up above one's neighbors. For instance, the Filipino says of anything that he does not approve of, not that it is wrong or that it is illegal, but that it is "ugly" (*pangit*) or "not nice". His highest praise is that a man is "easy to get along with," a regular fellow. The Malays, then, are natural conformists.

They are also conservative in the sense that they seldom plan for the future and never think of sacrificing the present ("The lovely here-and-now") for it. They are not cerebral, but sensuous; not activists, but philosophers; seldom earnest, always ingenious. They are also at once wily and naive, loquacious and secretive, intelligent and improvident. And it is the carrot, not the stick that governs them best — a cry of *Merdeka!* from ten thousands of throats, the smile of a beloved politician.

The Malay is also the world's child of nature and, in one sense, the oldest hippie. Because nature has always been bountiful to him and fortune often unkind, he would rather throw away a year's pay on a *fiesta* or sit in his garden all day listening to the singing of his pet birds than do some work. Carousing and bird-song, he has learned, are more satisfying and dependable than five-year socio-economic programs.

Therefore the Malay's art, too, (with the exception of the Hindu-Indonesian temples and the magnificent rice terraces of Banaue in Northern Philippines and despite enormous talent) is evanescent, slight and frivolous. Bamboo arches and paper lanterns to be used for an evening's delight, back-breaking embroideries on flimsy pineapple threads or short stories in a borrowed language express the cries of his heart.

This frivolity is reflected in the very disorderliness of the Malay's new governments. His political programs are maddeningly confused; his summit meetings and inter-ministerial conferences are liable to dissolve into a series of bawdy stories about dancing girls. But he was once an empire builder (the *Madjapahit* and the *Sri-Vijaya*) and he may, under the right stars, become at least a confederacy again.

For the modern Malay is not so free nor so erratic as one might think. He has his family ties, his rituals and fetishes; and that is the steadiest thing in his fluid world. The Malay family, whether as a single unit or a clan, is the world's best security system. The humblest Malay has at least one relative ready to comfort, support him and die for him. Parents, children, kinsmen, god-parents, tribe and village are his sources of strength.

He had endless rituals and incantations, so ancient that they lie underneath his Catholicism or his Muslim pieties like an unseen leaven. There are set forms for every possible activity, from courtship to ancestor worship, and innumerable fine distinctions of rank and kinship with corre-



sponding duties and niceties attached to each. Religion and politics (strong theocratic background makes it difficult for him to tell one from the other) have their own mystique.

Self-confident and secure; with many blithe excursions into hetero-sexual excess, the Malay is, like many a more monogamous male from the West, a bit afraid of his women. The Malay women have never accepted *purdah* even when they embraced the rest of Islam; and for thousands of years, have maintained an economic equality that often turned into supremacy.

For all that, this patient, pliant hedonist will suddenly display, as Western anthropologists have noted, "a hysterical streak". The rampaging *amok* (the very term is Indo-Malay), suddenly filled with a frenzy for killing is an altogether too frequent occurrence among Malays to be dismissed.

There are religious as well as medical reasons for this phenomenon. The Islamic strain which reached the Philippines, for instance, seems to have contained a peculiar ingredient of violence. Thus the *juramentados* of Mindanao are thought to have been bound by a vow to take the lives of Christians to achieve the Muslim heaven.

But a psychiatric disorder is the more modern, and plausible, explanation. Contemporary Filipino psychiatrists say that the behavioral aberration is probably brought on, in an impulsive, immature, oversensitive Malay, by environmental conditions, and that it is the very cultural pattern of repressing hostile feelings and dissembling all disagreement that leads to the breaking point: a homicidal mania, really a form of suicide with the victim, goaded and tormented and unable to mask any longer a fit of jealousy or a bankruptcy, turning against the whole world until he himself is killed.

3. The second component of traditional Filipino culture is Chinese. The influence of China and the Chinese people must be traced back to the pre-Malay migration which took place before the Christian era, the evidence being the entry of Chinese pottery into the Philippines through people originating from north central China and Fukien province before the true Porcelain Age between 1300 and 1500 BC.

The second phase was through trade, first indirectly through the Arabs and then from the late 11th century, directly. Agricultural development also came through China, with the most remarkable evidence being the rice terraces of the Mountain Province in Luzon which are now called the eighth wonder of the world. The terraces built by the Ifugaos along the mountains of Mayoyao and Carballo are like stairways to the sky, carved out of mountain sides. Spreading over nearly 400 sq. km., they constitute a green and living testament to the ingenuity of the mountain people in devising agricultural techniques — a masterpiece of human skill, patience and endurance. The eminent archaeologist, Dr. Beyer, believes that the first terraces were built more than 2,000 years

ago and that the original terrace builders came from somewhere in the region of South China around the Tonkin Gulf.

The diggings and remnants of Chinese pottery in the Philippines are important only insofar as they give clues to Filipino culture before the Spanish *conquista*. They were originally imported as household utensils, thereby exerting a negative and almost completely destructive effect on native ceramics. They became, increasingly, funerary and mortuary furniture, items for social rituals, and moving on from that, to symbols of wealth and ostentation. In some regions they also became vehicles of war and magic and were woven into the fabric of imagination and legends.

The already preponderant Chinese root became more so at the end of the 16th century, through the agency of the Spanish colonizer. The Spaniards encouraged the Chinese to stay in the Philippines because they were competent and hardworking and they quickly became the main prop of the colony.

The first Philippine book, "Doctrina Christiana" was printed and bound in the Philippines by Keng Yong, a Chinese resident in the Parian of San Gabriel in 1593, when there were also enough construction materials such as bricks, tiles, and lime supplied by the local Chinese.

According to the report of Gomez Perez Dasmariñas in 1591, the Parian or Chinese quarter already had 200 shops and contained about 2,000 Sangleys including merchants and all kinds of skilled workmen, with their judge and governor. Seventeen years later, when Morga wrote his "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas" in 1609, the Chinese shops in the Parian already numbered more than 400 with 8,000 men who generally traded therein.

It is estimated that about 10% of Filipino genes is Chinese. The percentage is probably much higher, culturally speaking. Most of the Filipino farm and household implements are Chinese; the methods used in agriculture, marketing and the domestic milieu are Chinese. The family system is remarkably Chinese.

The Chinese mind, a blend of philosophy and pragmatism, has been transplanted into the Filipino psyche. Patience and perseverance, hardiness and foresight, frugality and thrift, foreign to the Malay matrix, have been infused into the Filipino character by the indomitable Chinese traders and craftsmen who came and stayed and were absorbed into the mainstream of Filipino life.

Few of the Chinese who came to the Philippines were intellectuals, scholars or highly educated. Nevertheless they carried in them the seeds of Chinese social thought. On analysis one might say that it is the Confucian philosophy which accounts for most of the values they inculcated. The Taoists had little use for society, the Legalists placed the state above the individual, Buddhism considered the status of the individual in ordinary society as immaterial. As strangers in a foreign land, later to be ruled by the European barbarians, the Chinese in the Philippines found Confucius the best and most useful mentor. Three ideals of Chinese culture have been carried over into Filipino life, although perhaps not articulated in precisely the Chinese way. The first is the ideal of filial piety which has made the relations between parents and children and lateral relatives a matter of ethics and honor. The second is the great emphasis on man as a social being, requiring the mastery of the art of social living, or of getting along with one's neighbors, a fundamental prerequisite to prosperity, happiness and even existence since man needs his fellow men to achieve his most important goals. The third is the classic solution to the most fundamental problem in Chinese thought. It has been expressed as "*Sageliness within and kingliness without.*" This ideal, expressed, nurtured and handed down continues to animate the best of Filipino society. The sageliness consists of self-improvement (witness the national passion for education) the cultivation of virtue and of personal worth and wisdom. Kingliness is displayed in elaborate dress, pride of place, ritual and etiquette, propriety and wealth and class distinctions. The tolerance, mildness and, in other words the *savoir faire* wordliness of Confucian thought, are indeed one of the main characteristics of the Filipino community today.

4. The Indian contribution lies mainly in art, manners and beliefs and, indirectly, in language.

The infiltration of Indian culture into the Philippines was already a fact at the time of the

Pallava colonies, which were scattered all over Malaysia. When the Pallavas of southern India, however, collapsed before the onslaughts of Chalukyas and the Cholas, the colonies blossomed into independent kingdoms and empires. Two of these independent kingdoms, the Sri-Vijaya Empire of Sumatra and the Madjapahit Empire of Djawa, held sway over vast territories in Malaysia. Through these two empires, Indian cultural influences flowed to the Philippines, greatly affecting the cultural development of the Filipinos.

Many traditions, customs, modes of dressing, architectural art, brass and copperware are Indian. Much of the ancient Filipino religious beliefs are features of the Bhraman religion of India. Hundreds of words of Sanskrit origin in the Filipino languages are Indian, although they most probably came to us through Indonesia. Extensive studies have sought to prove that many of our legends and tales are strikingly similar to Indian folk literature. The jewelry of the pre-Spanish Filipinos, their decorative art on weapons and on housefronts are unmistakably Indian too.

Perhaps, even more indicative of India in the Filipino soul and the fact that rather than being an influence India was absorbed into the traditional Filipino culture are the folk beliefs which Filipinos still share with some parts of India: for instance, that when a person dreams his teeth have fallen out, one of his friends or relatives will die; or that going to bed before recently washed hair has completely dried will lead to insanity or that a thorn in one's throat can be cured by a cat's paw.

In truth, Indian customs, art and language formed an integral part of the cultural existence of the Philippines long before it became known as the Philippines. The Spaniards then had a great deal of reason to award to the Filipinos in their still nameless archipelago the appellation afterwards considered pejorative of "*Indio*." More than either of them knew, Filipinos were indeed and in many ways, truly "*Indios*."

5. Spain brought both Europe and America within the ken of the Filipinos. It must not be thought however that the very first contact with Europe and the West was Magellan's "discovery." The Portuguese had captured Malacca more than a decade before Magellan and from that vantage point had made themselves felt through the whole Malaysian area. There was, to begin with, limited trade between Rome and China, both by sea and overland, at the very beginning of the Christian era, and for at least three or four centuries before then there had been trade between India and Greece, India having been invaded by Alexander the Great in the 4th century B.C. and having left his mark and that of his civilization. And archaeologists working in the Philippines have found beads that came originally from Greece, Rome and Asia Minor some thousands of years ago.

The Spanish contributions to Filipino life are rather well known. The most famous although perhaps not the most important was Christianization. The second was social organization along Western lines leading to political unity and to another Western institution, the nation. Other contributions were Spanish law, the Spanish language, and a certain Spanishness in the national character, now most discernible as volatility, its bravura and an effervescence which immediately struck the historian Toynbee during his first visit to Manila.

The Spaniards, and the Spanish-Mexicans, organized the Filipinos, made them townspeople living under the shadow of the church, the parish house and the parish school, and the town hall, built roads, brought new plants and improved agriculture, kept the peace, imposed authority and gave them the idea of nationhood, in other words, by dint of methods which were often cruel and repressive and just as often well-intentioned, made the Filipinos over into medieval Europeans.

Among the Spanish-American botanical and agricultural—and therefore economic contributions—are corn, sweet potato, potato, cassava, kidney and lima beans, chickpeas, peanuts, squash, tomato, bell pepper and chili pepper, cacao and fruits like the guava, chico, sugar apple, sour sop, cashew and plum. And of course, tobacco and pararubber.



Culturally, Spanish influence is more apparent than real. The architecture of Filipino towns, the different types of public buildings and homes, furniture, tools, implements and weapons, the national costumes, styles and tastes in dress and jewelry, many art forms like the *zarzuela* and the verse dramas, traditional skills like embroidery and woodcarving and very specially song and dance are mostly Spanish. In any folk dance or Filipino music repertoire, a very large part is recognizable and indubitably Spanish in origin.

The names of Filipinos are Spanish and although at its peak, Spanish was spoken by no more than one per cent of Filipinos and now by less than one-half of one percent, the Filipino languages have borrowed and absorbed thousands of Spanish words. The language of the Philippine Revolution and of its leaders who were Europeanized *ilustrados* was Spanish. So was the bulk of Filipino historical and literary works till the first decade of the 20th century.

The very rhythm of life in Filipino towns and cities is still Spanish. The family rituals of Sunday worship and public holidays are Spanish. So are chaperones or duennas who incidentally, are very much around. Mourning and courting customs are mainly Spanish. The religion of 80% of Filipinos is Spanish Catholicism, although it is based upon a folk Christianity that still sets great store by pre-Spanish superstition and pagan beliefs.

Many of the value judgments, or the social standards of Filipino life are Spanish in origin. The quixoticism of Filipinos—a combination of generosity and arrogance—is Spanish. Gentility, or the emphasis on appearances, on reputation, privilege and status, and that concept that so often crops up in Filipino politics, *delicadeza*, are all Spanish.

In fact, many modern Filipinos are more Spanish than the modern Spaniards. They are in fact 19th century Spaniards, and are frozen by the cultural lag into attitudes that have ceased to be current in Spain and are associated only with the colonial habits of self-indulgence, privilege and despotism.

All these contributions—enrichments if you like—from Spain are negated by the greatest single change wrought in the Filipino mind by Spain, and this is the sense of inferiority, the four-hundred-year old suspicion shading off into certainty that because one is a native and brown and small-nosed and Asian, one is not so good as the white man. This psychological damage wrought on an entire people by colonization cannot possibly be exchanged for all the baroque churches, the Spanish poems, the elegance and gentility of the Filipinas who win beauty contests abroad. It is the black contribution and the black influence of what Spanish writers have called *La Española Negra*, a colonial hangover that modern-day Filipinos are still struggling to get over today.



6. Much of the Spanish influence was inextricably mixed in with Spanish-American and American Indian culture, i.e., Mexico. This is the reason why modern urban Filipinos are often mistaken abroad for Mexicans. It is not only that the racial mixture is similar, for the Mexican Indians were after all supposed to have originally started out from Asia—but that the culture, the way of looking at and doing things is uncannily similar. Cuernavaca and Mexico City remind one of nothing so much as Pre-War Intramuros (Spanish Manila) or of Vigan or any period Filipino city. Market day in Filipino small towns is Mexican, down to its name, its products, its menus. The mixture of combativeness and languor which one finds in Mexico is to be found here too. Filipino churches and town plazas, ikons and tastes in dress and social customs are definitely Mexican.

It is important to remember that for two-and-a-half centuries Madrid governed Manila through Mexico. It was only after Mexican independence that Manila was governed directly from Madrid. Before that, Manila was directly linked to Acapulco for two hundred forty years through the noble ships and the ignoble trade of the famous Galleons. From 1571 the year Legazpi the first *conquistador* and a Spanish Mexican himself, conquered Manila to 1815 when Mexico declared its independence from Spain, the galleons were the umbilical cord that tied the Philippine colony to Spain through Mexico. The galleons, varying in tonnage from three hundred to two thousand tons carried officials, missionaries, arms, the royal orders, official correspondence and great stores of Mexican silver pesos, the famous dollar of pieces-of-eight which became legal tender throughout Asia. They brought to Mexico cargoes of silk and tea and tapestries from China, textiles from India, the much-sought-after and valuable spices which began the European Age of exploration, gold, cotton and yellow wax from the Philippines. To this day the *Manton de Manila* adorns Mexican balconies and living rooms and the Mexican national costume is called *La China puebalana*, two of the many evidences that Filipino-Mexican cultural exchange was good both ways.

7. American influence, the shortest and the newest cultural influence in the Philippines, has wrought the most dramatic changes.

To be quite accurate: American influence did not start only in 1898, the year when the Philippine-American war broke out. It can actually be traced to what is called in American history, the China trade. The first two U.S. ships reached Manila in 1792, with cargoes of sugar. The first U.S. residents in Manila came in 1817, establishing themselves as a result of the opening of Philippine ports by the Spanish crown to international commerce in 1805. The U.S. government had a consul in Manila since 1817 although he was not recognized.

It was through shipping that American influence first made itself felt. The New England Clippers of 1840 came and went with their cargoes of tea and silk and sugar—and incidentally



Oriental culture—which resulted in the first U.S. firms being established in Manila. At the time, however, the preponderant trade power in Manila was British and the British took over, in the 1870's and 1880's, the few American business firms in Manila, so that at the time of the Philippine-American war there were no American firms in the country at all.

The Europeanized urban Filipino elite already knew America and admired its democratic ideals. The national hero, Jose Rizal, traveled to the U.S. and wrote extensively in his diary about its culture and institutions. But it was not till the famous Open Door policy in China, and the era of gunboat diplomacy and lastly of the war with Spain over Cuba, and the Philippine Revolution which ended in the Philippine-American war and in American occupation and a regime that lasted almost 50 years that American influence became formal and dynamic.

What are the U.S. contributions to Filipino life? The most obvious and most important have been: public health, a system of roads, mass education, the English language perhaps spread over too thinly but nevertheless spread over so well that the Philippines is now the third largest English-speaking nation in the world, and formal democracy.

The latter item is a highly controversial question in present-day Philippines. There is no doubt that the idea and the ideals of democracy in the Philippines are not owed to America or for that matter to Europe and the West. The most primitive Ifugao villages in the mountainsides of the Philippines practiced a kind of democracy for centuries. Indeed Oriental and Chinese humanism has made it possible for Filipinos long before Magellan to claim what political scientists would have to admit was democracy.

But the U.S. gave Filipinos the modern mechanics and the techniques of Westernized democracy, and made it institutional and systematic. The Americans trained Filipinos in public service and administration along American lines, and although the Philippine Constitution of Malolos shows that the Filipinos would probably have done it on their own anyway, history gave the Americans the chance to do it for them. The presidential system, the Congress, municipal government and above all, the system of patronage and spoils are derived from American political institutions.

The American regime literally changed the face of the Filipino nation. A network of roads sprouted, agriculture and trade flourished and despite an unfortunate dependence on the U.S. health centers, hospitals, public schools sprang up and so did, almost literally, the whole Filipino population whose mortality rates decreased and average height increased.

Apart from that, the American regime added a new important ingredient to the national character: pragmatism. "The American is pragmatic," wrote Francisco Araneta of the American impact on Philippine culture. "He is chiefly concerned with doing . . . If he becomes concerned



with a system of thought, he wants to know what can be done with the system of thought after he has developed it. He is concerned with things and with quantities and he likes to do for the sake of achieving."

American culture taught a new generation of Filipinos to ask two questions: "Does it work?" and, "What has he done?" Before that the central problems were the Oriental, "What does he feel?" or "What is he thinking?" and the Spanish, "Who is he?". The American influx set the whole philosophical and social structure on its head. "What can it do?" became the most important question.

A corollary ingredient was organization. Since life was primarily to depend on things working out, the next concern was how to do it. American know-how, based on the impersonal working of rules and forces, became the magic component that gave Filipino society a new drive. All over Asia today Filipino businessmen, managers, organization men have the edge, in some ways even over the economic miracle of Japan, because of the Americanization of the Filipinos in these fields.

The Protestant ethic of rationality, of questioning, of independent thinking, and of direct communication was also introduced by America. Far more than the small numbers of their converts would indicate, the Protestants exerted influence over the Filipino mind. Much of the depressing rigidity and authoritarianism of Roman Catholicism was changed overnight into the practical, no-nonsense, casual attitudes of Protestantism which helped a great deal in doing away with the centuries-old accretion of superstition, privilege and pomp and pushed Filipinos into the new world of social mobility and free enterprise.

In the Philippines today, even Catholics have a good word to say for the rigorous honesty and industry of Protestant Filipinos. One sect, the *Iglesia ni Cristo*, has replaced the Philippine Independent or Aglipayan Church in political influence and is, by dint of its admirable organization, able to get more jobs and control more votes than any other group in the Philippines.

The transplanting of American culture and American institutions onto Filipino soil—a systematic and deliberate effort—was not without its negative results. The rapid and often ruthless process of culture-grafting evolved some monstrous aberrations which are still to be seen in the schizophrenia of the young Filipinos and the vulgarity of our cities. The intellectual pupillage under America tore the will out of the Filipinos and instead of ensuring their survival made them dependent on American leadership as well as on American goods, an addiction which extends from Philippine foreign policy to the balance of trade and is the most dangerous of the Filipino's hangups.



For the rest of it, American influence on Filipino culture can be dismissed as no more than the omnipresent and widely decried "Coca-Colonization" which, in the last two decades has shaken the entire world, from the U.S.S.R. to Vietnam and from Paris to Australia. The world has been going through an American decade. In the Philippines it has been an American half-century.

8. As in the case of all other cultures, Western or Oriental, Filipino culture did not receive foreign influences passively, and nowhere did it adopt it whole and indiscriminately and without somehow changing it and making it its own. Indian sanskrit and Indian art, imbibed through Indonesia, became subtly transmuted into something else. The Chinese family system, Chinese philosophy and customs were shorn here and there, added to, digested and absorbed till they were no longer Chinese but Filipino. In the same way, Spanish derivations underwent a sea and climate change till they were not really Spanish. And American borrowings, while retaining a surface similarity to their "stateside" origins have been twisted here and there, magnified or dwarfed, or given unexpected frills and furbelows, their very essence changed into something Filipino.


All cultures are, in the last analysis, only and entirely themselves. Filipino culture, buffeted and exposed more than most others is still that—only and entirely itself.



The Filipino youth is still fighting the wars of his grandfather

By ADRIAN CRISTOBAL

CAUTIONARY NOTES ON STUDENTS



Philippine history is a garden fertilized with the blood of the young. The Revolution of 1896, forerunner of the anti-colonialist revolutions of the twentieth century, was launched by a drop-out; another drop-out, just past his teens, was its "brains." From first to last (until it was betrayed by prudent elders), the Revolution was a student thing, a youth "happening," from Jose Rizal, who inspired it, to the teen-aged general, Goyong del Pilar, who gave it its finest hour in Tirad Pass. No one is astonished that today's Filipino youth look to 1896 as their spiritual heritage, and that the more militant among them consider it their destiny to realize the revolutionary dream of total decolonization, or to use their special term, national liberation.

The vocabulary is contemporary—and Marxist, only in the sense that Marxism, for good or ill, seems able to provide the rhetorical, if not ideological, focus for the "anti-imperialist" struggle. And yet the most enthusiastic employers of this vocabulary are no more communist, perhaps, than the American "Maoist" or "Marxist" student left, from the S.D.S. to the Black Panthers. Still, many of the Filipino student rebels regard themselves as guerrillas in a new war against society, pursuing, however (and in contrast to their counterparts in developed nations), a frustrated historical dream of national freedom. The difference is, on the other hand, dialectically reconciled: the student rebellion in the Third World joins hands with that of the developed world in the latter's opposition to big-power nationalism, which translates into the former as "imperialism." Only in this sense can the Filipino student rebellion be regarded as part of the world phenomenon.

But the world has also become a "global village", so that the occupation of Columbia University leads inevitably to the near occupation of the University of the Philippines, and the May 1968 uprising in Paris is re-echoed a year later in the Battle of Mendiola bridge. More than the proletariat of any given period in history, the student rebels come closest to the concept of world-wide solidarity, or global "class-consciousness."

All the same, the Filipino student youth are still fighting the wars of their grandfathers, or even their fathers: national independence from foreign domination, social apathy and indifference, the unifying hold of a single national language, economic and social equality, the end of official graft and corruption, with the singular difference that, unlike the student youth of old, they are more "mass-oriented" and they are, for all their inevitable differences, united in purpose.

The convenient—and complaisant—analysis is that the student movement is divided between the moderates, who provide the mass base, and the radicals, who act as some kind of revolutionary elite; there is supposedly a mortal division in tactics: the moderates are for peaceful change and the radicals for armed struggle. But this mortal division, although there is incessant name-calling from both sides ("clerico-fascist," on the one hand and "communists" on the other), has not prevented moderates and radicals from making common cause in mass demonstrations against the Establishment. They share common ideals, if not values.

There is a fundamental difference between today's student youth and yesterday's. It can be said without exaggeration that the Filipino youth have always risen to the challenge of every crisis of the race, from the revolutionary fight for independence to the "parliamentary" struggle of the Commonwealth period. Every generation, willy-nilly, had its student nationalists, but this present generation can only tolerate the nationalists of old, for these believed that they could change society from within the Establishment as dissenters—in effect, the standard democratic way. Today's Filipino youth believe that the Establishment can only be changed, or crushed, from without, and that to join it is to compromise the cause.

This is also the reason behind the State's occasional charges of "subversion," of which the Nilo Tayag case is the most celebrated. In turn, the student rebels reply, Rizal himself, the national hero, was executed as a subversive by an oppressive regime.

"Subversion" has an ominous ring in the Philippines: it is what separates the comparative safety of the student activist from the perils of the dissident in the mountains. Herbert Marcuse coined the word, "repressive tolerance"—that society allows dissent so long as it is ineffective, thus frustrating change. From this angle, there is "repressive tolerance" for the student activist or "revolutionary" but not for those who have left the streets for the countryside.


Which brings up to an assessment of the effectiveness of student rebellion. At this point, it may be well to point out that "unrest" is too tame a word to use about student activism. It is not mere unrest that makes students of the most conservative, even reactionary, sectarian schools to leave their classes and man pickets calling for the ouster of foreign rectors, reduction of tuition fees, and sweeping reforms in school administrations. Nor is it mere unrest that hitherto faithful laity denounce their Cardinal, once an untouchable Prince of the Church, for avarice and anti-labor, anti-poor practices, or for young secular priests to protest against iniquities within the Institutional Church. Official graft and corruption is even the least of the issues that students march against; their litany of grievances include the presence of foreign military installations and the massacre of innocent folk as part of political vendettas. In their marches, their heads are bashed or they are shot down, but they march again and again.

But the question of their effectiveness is not easily answered. Opinions are mixed. It is certain, however, that the students have been able to shake officialdom and the rich. High government officials no longer use low-numbered car plates, as the demonstrations have shown that these were an invitation to harassment and even injury. For a while, at least, the number of "high society" parties diminished considerably, since there were rumors of demonstrations against the enclaves of the rich, to be led, astonishingly enough, by the scions of the rich themselves. Socialites, openly and anonymously, have started involving themselves in "social work," donating playgrounds, goods, and nursery and grade schools to the poor. Individual businessmen and business firms, recognizing in some measure what the students are trying to do, contribute cash and products to various student organizations; the cynical call this insurance but others regard it as compassion.

The essential thing is that the student activists have ventured forth into areas which traditionally concern the social agencies of the government: land reform, unionism, and the working conditions of the *zacadass*, but in which government seemed to be facing insurmountable difficulties in implementation and enforcement. In this respect, student activism has helped government in pursuing more vigorously its social policies.

When national conscience was aroused over the burning of two Ilocos barrios, student activists helped in transporting and housing the hundreds of refugees who came down to Manila to protest their plight to the authorities, thus easing some of the burden of the social welfare agencies.

This constructive aspect of the student rebellion, contradicting the radical stance of presiding over the death of a corrupt society, has endeared it to members of the Establishment who want something done about the miserable social conditions in the country. In this sense, rebellion against society has the ultimate effect of strengthening, as reforming, it.



There are nonetheless certain quarters calling themselves "the silent majority," who believe that vandalism during demonstrations—bomb-throwing, glass-breaking, the destruction of parks—have served ill the students' cause. It is a matter of property rights, they say, against the right to demonstrate. But judgment in this regard is blurred by the behavior of police and military authorities. The opposition politicians, for example, riding high on student activism as a sign of discontent against the administration (when it is, in fact, discontent against the existing order), confuse the issue further by blaming everything on the police, and this gives substance to the "fascist" characterization of the State. What is more likely, however, is that police behavior is conditioned, first, by subjective psychological reasons (they have not had this experience before), and, second, by their inability to understand what the student movement is all about. Moreover, it is no secret that most police agencies are guilty of the corruption and the repression that the student rebels continue to denounce.


All the same, the consensus is that the students should be allowed to take to the streets whenever they believe that protest is necessary. The hope, however, is that there should be no provocation from whatever quarter, to which student militants reply, recalling Marcuse's "repressive tolerance," that unless they disturb the public peace, the authorities will not take them seriously. An expansion of defiance, therefore, is the answer to "repressive tolerance."

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All student organizations call themselves revolutionary, but some are more revolutionary than others. The most revolutionary is the Kabataang Makabayan, some of whose leaders have been either arrested or killed under mysterious circumstances. The KM is most articulate in the press and most "Maoist" in its slogans. Then there are the S.D.K. (Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan—Student Democratic Society), the MDP (the Movement for Democratic Philippines), the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (a pacifist group that rose in response to the Vietnam War), and many other initials limited only by the imagination of the organizing groups in all of the schools, private and public. The "popularity" of the protest can be judged by the fact that in one sectarian girls' college, grade school students threatened to walk out to call for a change in uniforms.

There is no central leadership, however, in the student movement. What it has is a number of leadership centers, which coordinate with one another whenever there is a massive project to be undertaken. The unifying ideology is change or revolution, but only the KM seems to have a program. Some student groups place their hope for peaceful change in the coming Constitutional Convention; others are skeptical about it; and still others quite literally expect a Revolution. But in every instance, there is a redeeming clause for government: it can still act to avert an upheaval.

The question is whether the Establishment can preside over its own demise—this, at least, in view of the militants.



Reform and Revolution are in the tradition of the Filipino students' demand for change. Before there emerged the revolutionary *Ang Katipunan*, there was the reformist *La Liga Filipina*. To the observer of student rebellion in the Philippines, the movement is perceived to oscillate between one and the other. The outcome depends entirely on circumstances, and not, as some agitators profess, on the will to revolution.

The classical revolutionary theorists hold that peaceful reforms are pursued without the renunciation of armed struggle, which shall succeed when the State has lost its will to resist. Thus the achievement of reforms is merely an index of the Establishment's power of resistance, since the Establishment will never consent to reforms if it does not have to. As the Establishment, then, loses institutional control in the face of achieved reforms, it becomes ripe for the death blow of the revolutionary executioner. The more ruthless a government becomes, the nearer it is to collapse.

This analysis may not work very well in the Philippine context. It is more accurate, perhaps, to suggest that only when the government and the Establishment are unable to reform themselves and institute social reforms can the whole structure of society collapse. There is, of course, an inertia to reform; one answered demand may lead to others *ad infinitum*, so that the momentum of change may lead to revolution, but Philippine history has shown a satisfaction for limited ends. The observation that the masses are too wise to be taken in by sweeping slogans applies both to revolutionaries and traditional politicians.

But the dangers of revolution are not thereby diminished. President Marcos himself has been widely quoted about our "sitting on top of a social volcano." The student movement is not sun-dared, as some would like to think, on the issue of ends and means; it is, moreover, reaching out to the masses in the countryside with a compelling message of hope and change... and it is not certain what form of action will be taken once that message is accepted as a call.

* * * *

The special urgency of the student call lies in its language: Tagalog. In the 1890s, the language of reform was Spanish; of revolution, Tagalog. In the Commonwealth and in this Republic, the language of reform is English, of revolution, Tagalog. All the student leaders are using Tagalog with an expertness and imagination and eloquence that their nationalist elders could not have attained. Their revolutionary Tagalog vocabulary translates complex social ideas into mass language, a device they have learned from Mao Tse Tung, the poet of revolution.

In Tagalog, the student activists have found a language that is both a unifier and revolutionary.

In his book, *An Essay on Liberation*, Herbert Marcuse spoke of a systematic linguistic rebellion, which he described in a long footnote:

"The familiar 'obscenities' in the language of black and white radicals must be seen in this context of a methodical subversion of the linguistic universe of the Establishment. 'Obscenities' are not officially co-opted and sanctioned by the spoken and written professions of the powers that be; their usage thus breaks the false ideological language and invalidates its definition. But only in the political context of the Great Refusal do obscenities perform this function. If, for example, the highest executives of the nation or of the state are called, not President X or Governor Y but pig X and pig Y, and if what they say in campaign speeches is rendered as 'oink, oink,' this offensive designation is used to deprive them of the aura of public servants or leaders who have only the common interest in mind. . . . The methodical use of 'obscenities' in the political language of the radicals is the elemental act of giving a new name to men and things, obliterating the false and hypocritical name which the renowned figures proudly bear in and for the system."

The linguistic behavior of the Filipino student rebels closely follows the Marcusean analysis. Up against the libertarian lexicon of the State, they dismiss the present political system as a

"pseudo-democracy" because of its social and economic inequalities. They resort, then, to convey their meaning dramatically—and for the practical purpose of being widely understood—by using the language of the masses, in contradiction of the foreign language of the ruling class. When they use this same foreign language, they cast a different, or perhaps profounder, meaning to the much-used words, democracy, justice, law and order, and equality.

This would be, in the context of Philippine history, a real revolution, one that cuts through the sensibility and consciousness of the 'underground' Filipino; a century-delayed acceptance of Simoun's proposition in Jose Rizal's inflammatory novel, *El Filibusterismo*. "They refuse you their language?" said Simoun to Basilio, who was agitating for Spanish language instruction. "Then be glad, so that you will be compelled to think your native thoughts in your native tongue!" Thus the student activists will be accomplishing what decades of legislation and patriotic exhortation have not been able to achieve.

* * * *

But what, when all is said and done, can be the future of student rebellion, on the one hand, and student radicalism, on the other? These are different sides of the same coin, each one nourishing the other. Will the moderates finally marry and take their place in the changing Establishment (changing in personnel, that is) to find themselves confronting the radicals who will since have evolved into Revolutionaries? Or will they too join their revolutionary brothers, after having despaired of any chance for real change? And what kind of government may come about if they should prove intransigent?

We can only speculate about a world in change — and a society in the throes of change. The ideal answer, of course, is a social and economic development so drastic, but not so violent that it will unleash unmanageable forces, that it will temper discontentment and unrest; a development so drastic that it will make 'participatory democracy' a reality among the masses. Government has already seeped into the barrios in the form of councils, but it is a question whether there is time enough for this generation to experience its salutary effects. There are still opportunities open to the educated young man, so that the so-called Establishment is still responsive to social mobility, but there is also the question whether these opportunities are enough and can long remain 'open.' There is evidence of some shift in Establishment thinking — as can be seen in the new faces in government, in the new reformists in the Institutional Church, in some sectors of the Press, and, of course, an emerging new orientation in business, but it is a question whether the Establishment can hold on to its nerve and not panic and thus react in a manner that will confirm the worst fears or propaganda of the agitators that it will rather repress than submit to necessity.



But every entrenched leadership in the Third World, given a fair regard for humanity and the national interest, feels that the current rebellion, led provisionally by the students, is a response to the power balance in the world, in the wide, wide gap between the world's rich and the world's poor. Student rebels in the Third World are up in arms against what they consider the submissiveness of their governments to foreign dominance (quite apart, of course, from other local issues), and few governments are honest enough to admit that this is so, out of regard for their own political positions. This insight has only recently been sanctioned by the Institutional Church which pointed out, through the Holy Father, the obligation of the world's rich nations to come to the aid of its poor. To follow this injunction requires of the powerful and rich of the world to pursue their interest with a little less rapacity and a little more benevolence, not for the sake of some abstract salvation, if that, indeed, is abstract to them, but for the sake of peace not only in one hemisphere but in all hemispheres.

No amount of self-discipline and honest toil can make the poor nations of the world catch up, in any meaningful way, with the rich; to achieve the minimum requirements of development, they will need all the help they can get. But if this is not forthcoming, then only an iron regime can accomplish the impossible, and to the young revolutionaries of this generation, this might even be more desirable than continuing national poverty, humiliating and miserable. "Better for thousands to die than for millions to live in shame." This is cruel mathematics, but it is an inevitable response to naked power.

This is the implacable message of the student rebellion, before which societies and governments tremble. The irony is that in our "global village," student demands can be met in the name of humanity—by the society of mankind as a whole, to enable the beleaguered societies to still their dangerous discontents.



The Philippines has produced one of the more respectable records of economic growth and relative stability

By SIXTO K. ROXAS

RECORD OF GROWTH

A young, highly literate population larger by half as much as it is today, bunched even more in urban centers, may be crowding the Philippines less than a dozen years from now.

A look at 1980 indicates that the country's labor force will have doubled over 20 years. Nearly two-thirds of it will still be engaged in agriculture with each hectare of farm land having to support about half a dozen people.

The Philippine economy will be turning out then products and services more than twice the value of the 1967 output. But because of the rapid increase in population, this gross national product (GNP) will average a few pesos below P1,000 (about \$255) per person. This is substantially better than the current per capita figure, but it will not mean any spectacular improvement in standards of living.

Launched as Southeast Asia's first independent nation in the worst of all times, immediately after the Pacific war and an enemy occupation had devastated its farms and factories, disorganized its society and its economy, the Philippine Republic has turned out a remarkable record for which it now gets little credit. It has remained the freest, the most genuine democracy in the region, gone through seven presidential elections, in four of which a party in power was unseated peacefully, and pursued an economic policy of private and free enterprise. It has success-

fully overcome internal communist subversion and even armed revolt while keeping the military under civilian control and innocent of political power.

Through all that it has produced one of the more respectable records of economic growth and relative stability. Its performance is little appreciated, however. It is compared unfavorably with the military states around it. It is criticized for precisely those manifestations that flow from its character as a democratic state with a political and administrative system patterned after that of the United States and suffering from the same difficulties of decision-making and control which is typical of the American system.

Before Pearl Harbor, the Philippines had a population of some 16 million. Anywhere from 75 to 85 per cent of this population was not overly dependent on a modern cash economy for their living but subsisted in small, self-sufficient village economies having purely marginal transactions with the monetary economy and relatively insulated from its gnawing ambitions and aspirations. The per capita real product was probably in the vicinity of \$145, of which about \$25 were exported and the proceeds exchanged for the imports of manufactured goods that sustained primarily the urban and monetary economy. With the sector dependent on this economy constituting a mere one-fifth of the nation, the trading economy was quite adequate to keep the population happy and even comfortable.

In 1946, after the Pacific War, in his first State of the Nation message, the first President of the new Philippine Republic depicted the stark condition of the nation's economy:

...the central fact of our economic condition is the tragic destruction of the productive economy. Sugar, hemp, copra, coconut oil, cigars, tobacco, minerals and lumber—these were once the staples which we exported overseas. Today 60 per cent of our sugar mills are destroyed; most of the others are in complete disrepair. Machinery has been broken, stolen or rusted away. Most of the lands themselves lie fallow.

The task of restoration was undertaken within the framework of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act and the Philippine Trade Act, both of which were passed by the U.S. Congress two months before independence. These measures appropriated \$620 million for reconstruction, two-thirds of it to compensate for about half of the private damage sustained by the Philippines during the war; provided that trade between the Philippines and the United States should be free until 1954, with absolute quotas established for the principal products imported from the Philippines; gave the U.S. control over certain critical economic decisions of the Philippine government (the peso's exchange rate and convertibility, and tariffs), and introduced the controversial parity provision which was later embodied into the Philippine Constitution, granting U.S. citizens equal rights with Filipinos in working Philippine natural resources and public utilities.

Two years after independence, reconstruction had not yet been completed, prewar facilities had not been restored. But the situation was really worse than even the poor figures indicated. It is probable that over half of the population was then dependent on the monetary economy. The dollar value of imports was running at about \$585 million and the trade deficit at \$275 million. World prices were running at about double prewar, however, and the real value of these trade figures at prewar purchasing power was about one-half. Domestic prices were about three times prewar.

The figures of the first postwar census in 1948, barely two years after independence,

provide some idea of the structure with which the new republic started. The population had grown from 16.0 to 19.2 million. The population of Metropolitan Manila (with suburban cities), which was 237,000 in 1903 and 860,000 in 1939, had grown to 1.4 million. The average age of the population had gone down, typical of populations which are growing rapidly as a result of reductions in death rates. The median age was 18.3 years in 1939 and 17.7 in 1948. This meant that the dependent population had grown more rapidly than the earning portion and every individual of economically productive age had to support a larger number of dependents.

These were the economic circumstances under which the Philippines commenced its career as an independent nation.

By the end of 1949, the prewar economy had been restored. But as the Bell Mission reported a year later:

While production in general has been restored to almost the prewar level, little of fundamental importance was done to increase productive efficiency and to diversify the economy. In agriculture, the area under cultivation was brought to the prewar level, and the livestock population partially restored. But almost nothing was done to open new lands for the position of farm workers and tenants. In industry, production was restored very much in the prewar pattern. While some new enterprises have been started, particularly in the past year, there has been little progress in opening new work opportunities and strengthening the economy. The country still relies too heavily on the export of a few basic agricultural crops—coconut, sugar and hemp—which provide a meager livelihood to most of the people engaged in their production.

It was obvious by then that such an economy could no longer sustain the postwar Philippines. In December 1949, the Central Bank of the Philippines established a system of exchange controls which was to become the principal instrument of protection adopted by a country without tariff or exchange autonomy

for effecting a transformation of its economy. It issued Circular No. 20 which subjected all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to licensing.

THE PHILIPPINE RECORD OF GROWTH

During the first half of the decade of the 1950s the Philippine economy took a big leap forward. Gross domestic product in real terms rose by 39.5 per cent over the five-year period or at an average annual rate of just under 7 per cent.

In this period the main thrust was understandably towards the substitution of local manufacturers for imports. Hence the growth of domestic manufacturing and the slower growth of imports of goods and services at slightly over 8½ per cent per year. Exports of goods and services received less inducement and push and grew at only 3.6 per cent per year.

In 1954 the Philippines negotiated for revisions in its trade agreement with the United States. The revisions, embodied in the Philippine Trade Agreement Revision Act of 1955 which became known as the Laurel-Langley Agreement, permitted the Philippines to impose tariffs on American goods entering the Philippines at rates that would progress toward 100 per cent much more rapidly than the U.S. rates on Philippine goods. Also the Philippines won back its autonomy over exchange.

The growth of the economy during the 10 years from 1956, although less rapid, was still quite substantial, at 5.4 per cent per year. The remarkable point about the growth over this period was that it was financed mainly through gross domestic savings. In the five-year period from 1956 to 1960, the Philippines was ploughing into gross domestic investments 14.6 per cent of gross national product. Net foreign assistance accounted for only 3.2 per cent of gross domestic investment, which domestic savings financed 96.8 per cent.

In the second five-year period (1961-1965) the average investment rate was 16 per cent of gross national product. External sources of financing were more important during this period, chiefly long term loans from the World Bank. Even then, domestic savings financed 91.5 per cent of gross domestic invest-

ment. In 1963 and 1965, there was actually a net reduction of foreign liabilities.

This growth was maintained with a comparatively low rate of inflation. The domestic price indices (exclusive of exports and imports) rose less than 4 per cent per year over the ten-year period.

GROWTH TRADE GAP

Developing countries need foreign assistance not merely because of a shortage in domestic savings but also because the development process needs capital goods, raw materials and services that must be imported.

The Philippines has now entered a stage at which the bottleneck to development is no longer the domestic savings rate but the growth in export earnings. The need for export growth arises not merely from the current import requirements but because of the burden imposed by direct investments and loans previously made which must be serviced with dividend remittances and interest and amortization.

In 1966 the country fortunately was enjoying rather good prices for a number of its exports and there was a net surplus on merchandise and invisibles accounts of \$65.3 million. In 1967 foreign exchange disbursements gained momentum. While merchandise trade hit a deficit of \$241.7 million, the largest deficit since the crisis of 1949, after taking foreign donations into account, the actual deficit on current account was a manageable \$32.9 million. But the capital accounts continued to show a net outflow for liquidation of foreign obligations and repatriation of capital.

Alarmed by the turn of events, the Central Bank instituted rigorous credit restrictions aimed at making importation of less essential producer and consumer products quite prohibitive.

But the problem does not seem to be the conventional one of merchandise trade as it is a matter of proper management of the external borrowing position of the country. At least since 1961, remittances for profits and capital repatriation have been consistently exceeding fresh inflows of direct foreign investments into the country. At the end of 1960, the value of foreign direct investments

in the Philippines was estimated at \$414 million. By the end of 1965 this had grown to \$530 million largely because of reinvestments. Over the same period, profit remittances had run at an average of \$37.3 million a year.

A parallel situation has existed with respect to foreign loans. Current repayments of past loans have been mounting up; and in the absence of fresh long term credits, the country in effect has been experiencing a net outflow of resources, rather prematurely for a country still ways off from self-sustaining growth. Part of the reason has been the heavy dependence of the country on conventional suppliers credits for a large part of its requirements. Also many of the private industries have been reluctant to incur long term foreign obligations. They have preferred to raise peso financing and to purchase their equipment for cash, thus putting great pressure on the country's balance of payments.

The situation the country finds itself in is typical of the developing country that is running into external debt service difficulties because it has not had the proper blend of conventional and soft loans to finance its foreign exchange needs. The Philippines has not been considered eligible for the soft IDA funds which it needs very badly now to permit the monetary authorities to remove the shackles which, in curbing credit and possibly imports, must necessarily also inhibit further growth.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The country needs to launch out in three directions simultaneously. Having established enclaves of import and domestic market-oriented small and fragmented enterprises, the Philippines must push for a consolidation of these scattered enterprises and their backward integration to establish linkages with domestic sources of raw materials. This means that intermediate industries must be fitted into the economic structure to bridge the gap between domestic primary industries and final processing and assembly. The integration of industries, however, requires large, stable and growing markets. These markets can originate only from two sources: the further expansion and development of the domestic market and the opening up of new export possibilities.

The only domestic market front that remains to be exploited is the rural market. For the large rural population of the country to become an effective market for manufactured goods, however, farm productivity and incomes must increase dramatically. Some headway has been achieved in this direction. The introduction and acceptance of the new rice varieties have meant not merely increased yield but something of a breakthrough in the adoption of modern agricultural practices.

The new land reform program was also intended to change the incentive climate in agriculture. By converting the sharecropper first into leaseholder paying a flat rental to landowners, and then into an owner-cultivator, it was hoped that the small farmer would cultivate his holdings far more intensively and derive yields from his average holding of some 1.5 hectares more comparable to his counterparts in Taiwan and Japan. There has been some success already in certain areas of the Philippines, particularly in the second district of Pampanga, some 50 miles north of Manila. Much more remains to be done, however.

While Philippine exports have not expanded as rapidly as those of some of the other countries in the region such as Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand, the growth rate has been fair. From 1962 to 1967 merchandise exports from the Philippines have been growing at an average annual compound rate of 12½ per cent per annum. But there has been an increasing trade gap which causes the fiscal and monetary authorities from time to time to clamp down on domestic credit and introduce selective regulations on foreign remittances in an effort to moderate the outflow of foreign exchange. There is recognition in the government, however, that the ultimate solution is to stimulate exports particularly of semi-processed and processed goods. Certain new agricultural products such as bananas have begun to appear on the export list. Also there is talk of establishing an international trading company to handle export trade promotion in the pattern of the Japanese bussan kaisha.

What lies in store for this republic of thirty seven million people?

In less than a dozen years, this country will have a population of 53.4 million, a little less

than that of present-day United Kingdom. It will be a young population with 35 out of every 100 under 10 years of age. A little more than half will be between the ages of 15 and 64. The labor force whose productive efforts will be required to support the population will number about 17 million, double that at the beginning of this decade.

THE PROMISE OF THE PHILIPPINES

It will also be an educated population with a literacy of about 90 per cent.

It will be a much more urban society with 45 out of every 100 people living in Metropolitan Manila, chartered cities, provincial capitals and the *poblaciones* or municipalities. This means an urban population of about 24 million.

The rural population will be 29.4 million. If the present proportion of labor force in agriculture (about 61.2 per cent) remains true then, the agricultural labor force will be about 10 million. Land suited for agriculture cannot be increased much beyond the present 7.5 million hectares if we exclude steep slopes, swamps and rocky lands. The best estimate is that by 1980 we will have about 8.7 million hectares under cultivation. By then, each hectare of land will be worked by an average of 1.26 people. Each hectare of farm land will have to support about six people.

Right now, Japan has among the highest ratios of agricultural labor force to farm lands, about 1.8 people per hectare. So our agricultural density will be about 70 per cent of Japan's. Our agricultural productivity, however, is much less than 70 per cent of the Japanese farmer's, perhaps only one-third. For our farmers to be in 1980 where their Japanese counterparts are now, we must at least double our national average yields.

This means also getting as much diversification as the Japanese. The increase agricultural yields cannot be from rice alone. A much more rapid rate of growth in vegetable and animal proteins will be demanded.

Taking what the Filipino has done in the past as a basis, it is possible to visualize what sort of levels of livelihood we could achieve in the 11 years to 1980.

From 1962 to 1967 we succeeded in raising our gross national product at an average com-

pound rate of 5 per cent per year. This meant we raised the average per capita product from something like \$515.90 per person to P719.50.

But the period from 1962 to 1967 may have been unusually good years, particularly since we had very good export prices up to about 1966. It may not be fair to use the same standards of performance for the years up to 1980. Let us make a few adjustments.

First, we probably would have to put somewhat more investments in fixed and other productive assets to get each peso increase in gross national income. Let us say we would need P4.00 of reinvestment to generate every P1.00 increase. This compares with the experience of many countries in a similar stage of development.

Let us also adjust the rate of growth in our export receipts to half the rate of the period 1962-1967, and the proportion of increases in gross national income which goes into savings from 53 per cent to, say, 30 per cent.

From 1962 to 1967, we were spending on additional imports and other foreign expenses an equivalent of P0.37 of each peso increase in gross national income. This was rather high. We must assume that, somehow or other, we could reduce this ratio to say, P0.25 to the peso.

One final point. In the six-year period, the country had no net inflow of foreign capital to assist it in its development. The rates of growth in exports and in imports that we assumed for projecting performance up to 1980 require that we have an average net inflow for the period of a modest \$21.4 million a year.

On the basis of these assumptions, it would be within the capacity of the Philippine economy to raise gross national product at the rate of 6 per cent a year. By 1980, this should then be running at P53.2 billion compared to P28.5 billion in 1968. Per capita, this would mean an increase from P719.50 to P995.76, despite the rapid increase in population; in dollar terms, it would be the equivalent of \$225.35 per person per year. The actual standard of living, while substantially better than now, would not be spectacularly higher, though.

But it would all have been still a respectable record of economic performance.

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"Development of human resources and promotion of human welfare are important requirements for any kind of development"

By ILEANA MARAMAG

BREAKTHROUGH IN SOCIAL WELFARE



Mrs. Marcos is shown with victims of Mayon Volcano eruption.

When Ferdinand E. Marcos assumed the presidency in 1965, he announced that one major concern of his Administration would be to give value to social welfare within the context of national development.

People were understandably skeptical. The government agency in charge of public welfare had been wracked by scandal; its image had been that of an institution which encouraged dole-outs and was utilized by politicians to ensure their election. But President Marcos was firm in his pronouncement. He said:

"We will not let politics or malice stand in the way of helping those who need help. For years, and through countless administrations, social workers had been trying to push through the idea of lifting welfare work in the Philippines above the level of rice and sardines. They spoke of decentralizing Welfareville, which had become, through laziness, inadequate funds and sheer ignorance, the dumping ground of society's rejects... The development of human resources and the promotion of human welfare are important requirements for any kind of development."

Heretofore, the country's unfortunate—the handicapped, the aged and mentally ill, the orphans and the delinquent, the alienated and the deprived—were considered burdens to society and not politically important since these ill-fated members of the community cannot vote. Welfareville, where the country's dependent groups lived in sub-human conditions, was a national disgrace.

Thus, to effectively implement a comprehensive intensified program of public welfare as an integral part of his program of action for national economic development, President Marcos—including the First Lady, Imelda Romualdez Marcos—actively worked for the reorganization of the government's welfare agency into a full-fledged Department of Social Welfare. The Marcos Administration committed itself to give value to the full development of man as a human being.

With the encouragement of the President, Imelda Romualdez Marcos initiated her nationwide Integrated Social Welfare program. Her primary consideration was to assist human beings whose lives and souls, she believed, did not have to be lost to circumstance. In a meeting at Malacañang in April 1966, the First Lady sought the expertise of those who had been long involved in welfare work to develop a comprehensive program action for the country's disadvantaged citizens.



President and Mrs. Marcos are shown at inauguration of Marillac Home for Girls.

The apathy and neglect at Welfareville prompted Mrs. Marcos to organize programs which today provide welfare services for all ages, covering the entire range of human need from the country's young to its senior citizens. On the advice of social service experts, she caused the construction of five welfare villages along modern methods of dispersal.

In the order of priorities, children and youth were given primary consideration. Mrs. Marcos channelled private philanthropy (in the amount of ₱787,859.10) for the construction of the first welfare village: a Recreation and Study Center for Children and Youth in Quezon City. Prominent women heeded the First Lady's appeal to furnish the Center's complex of 12 cottages where youngsters—from infancy to 16 years old—live under a family-centered program of activities.

Each cottage has a house parent who provides substitute parental love, attention and care and other homelife needs to the children while their special problems are being studied, diagnosed and treated.

The Center not only provides temporary shelter, care and rehabilitation. It trains child care workers and serves as research laboratory for referral cases, methods in the prevention of juvenile delinquency, and the extent of effectiveness of treatment approaches to children's delinquent behavior and their related problems. All these are in line with the First Lady's belief in tracing the root causes of problems among children with a view to eliminating them and not merely to alleviating them.

NAYON NG KABATAAN (*Orphanage*)

For 45 years, hundreds of orphans were dumped in a dilapidated building in Welfareville and then forsaken. Administration after administration allowed the orphanage to deteriorate. The conditions were so abominable the Bureau of Buildings condemned the orphanage as unfit for human habitation and dangerous to human lives.

Shocked by these conditions, Mrs. Marcos raised funds for the construction of a new home for the children to provide them healthier surroundings and fresh hopes for a better life. The new orphanage—a complex of 14 cottages completely furnished by the Ladies Volunteer Committee of the First Lady—was built in Pasay City along modern-day concepts of child care. The obsolete one-building type of housing was abandoned. Instead, cottages were built to promote the concept of family-centered activities.

Completed at a cost of ₱562,499.82, the Nayon ng Kabataan has facilities for the care, training and education of 200 orphaned, abandoned and neglected children whose ages range from 4 to 16. Orphans and youngsters who have to be separated from their families or guardians are given home care, citizenship training and education so that when they return to their families and the community they shall have become useful and responsible citizens.

From the time of their admission to the day of their discharge, the youngsters are provided social services. Their parents and relatives are also encouraged to use the services of the orphanage so that the problems which caused the children's placement in the 'Nayon ng Kabataan' may be better understood and dealt with positively to hasten their return to their families and the community.

MARILLAC HOME FOR GIRLS

Marillac Hills is the third of five welfare villages built by the First Lady under her Integrated Social Welfare program. It is the national center for the rehabilitation of girls who have come in conflict with the law.

For many years, the girls lived in sub-human conditions in Welfareville until Mrs. Marcos built this new village in Alabang, Rizal, to give them a new lease in life in an ideal environment. Built at a cost of ₱500,506.84, Marillac Hills is a complex of 12 cottages, all furnished by the Ladies Volunteer Committee of the First Lady.

Most of the girls have court cases pending against them. Some cases involve parental disobedience. Others have been sentenced for some minor infraction of the law. Once committed to Marillac Hills, the girls are provided with opportunities to satisfy adequately their physical and emotional needs. More important, they are prepared socially, vocationally and psychologically for return to their families and the community.

Recreational facilities form a significant part of the treatment and the rehabilitation of the girls. Planned activities that orient them to their future responsibilities and needs are part of their rehabilitation. The village has an education building for special classes for girls with special education needs. When practicable, the girls are allowed to attend elementary and high school classes in Alabang.

The staff of the village, through casework, individually helps the girls and their parents to use the institution's services to strengthen their relationships, specially their social adjustment. Parents are made to understand the problems that brought about their daughter's confinement at the village.

GOLDEN ACRES (*Home for Senior Citizens*)

On a two-hectare lot in Quezon City, the First Lady has built her fourth welfare village: Golden Acres or Home for the Aged and Infirm. The Home has seven spacious cottages, two for the strong and healthy residents and one for the infirm. In addition, there are cottages for the staff, administration offices, a sick bay, and one central kitchen and laundry, with an area for

vocational activities. It will cost approximately half a million pesos, mostly from donations of the private sector.

The new village replaced the Old Home for the Aged in Mandaluyong which outlived its use and was considered outmoded. Golden Acres, as envisioned by Mrs. Marcos, provides our elder citizens with decent homes, better surroundings and a healthier environment.

VICENTE MADRIGAL VILLAGE FOR BOYS

The Vicente Madrigal Village for Boys, located on a 18-hectare site in Tanay, Rizal, is the fifth and largest welfare village to be built under the First Lady's Integrated Social Welfare program. As conceived by Mrs. Marcos, the Village is a farming community for some 500 young boys who have committed offenses against the law. As part of their training and rehabilitation, boys are taught how to farm, principally grow vegetables and raise poultry and swine to prepare them to earn their living immediately after their release. Those who wish to pursue a career in agriculture will be provided scholarships as part of the First Lady's goal of giving the youngsters a new lease in life. As in all the welfare villages set up by Mrs. Marcos, the boys undergo a family-centered daily living program that orients them to their future responsibilities and to prepare them socially, vocationally and psychologically for return to their families and community.

ASSISTING THE MENTALLY ILL

For years, the inhuman conditions at the mental hospital were a disgrace. The conditions were reminiscent of slave labor camps. The patients were neglected and abandoned. Many of them were emaciated and diseased. Most were in various degrees of nakedness.

Nearly all the pavilions were filthy and dirty. The stench was unbearable. The patients were crowded into pavilions, like animals herded in a corral and left to endure wretched conditions. Most of the wards did not have beds. The sick slept on the cold bare floor. Many became chronic tubercular patients.

Inadequate sewage disposal and an antiquated plumbing system compounded the deplorable conditions. There were not enough eating utensils. Many patients ate like animals from rusty pails. They shared plates and glasses, thus contaminating one another. The hospital also suffered from a shortage of nurses.

This outrageous state of human degradation in the mental hospital continued for years. It took the First Lady to improve conditions in the mental hospital. She visited the hospital and saw for herself the inhuman conditions at the hospital. What she saw was repulsive. After making her own private investigations on the ineptitude and maladministration of hospital officials, she took action immediately.

Today the whole atmosphere at the hospital has been changed. It is no longer a depressing experience to visit the National Mental Hospital. The First Lady by her action in improving conditions in the mental hospital has shown that the Marcos Administration believes in the worth and dignity of the individual and that every citizen, regardless of his misfortune, deserves attention and humane care.

SAVE A LIFE IN EVERY BARRIO

Quietly and without fanfare, Mrs. Marcos initiated what is known as her 'Save A Life in Every Barrio' project. It is one of the First Lady's programs which has effectively brought prompt welfare and medical assistance to barrio folk.

The program began inauspiciously in Jolo, Sulu in 1966 when she visited the Moslem capital. Two handicapped Moslem youths—one a cripple, the other blind—caught the attention and sympathy of the First Lady. With their parents' permission, Mrs. Marcos brought the two youngsters for treatment in Manila. Pahallawan Aradain, after a delicate eye operation, recovered his eyesight, while Pilgansa Panduca, the cripple, was fitted with a new wooden leg and underwent occupational therapy for three months.

Realizing how many other economically disadvantaged families in the rural areas must need

the same prompt welfare attention, Mrs. Marcos launched her 'Save A Life In Every Barrio' program on a nation-wide scale.

The Department of Social Welfare, PACD, Puericulture Centers and Rural Health Units serve as coordinating agencies. If treatment is not possible at the nearest provincial hospital, the patient is brought to Manila for treatment. To date, the program has assisted thousands of indigents in almost all 66 provinces. A full-time social worker on the staff of the First Lady does case study and referrals. Treatment is provided by doctors who volunteer their services as a philanthropy of skills.

DISASTERS

No country is spared from natural disasters such as fires, typhoons, floods, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, and the Philippines has not been an exception. And whenever a disaster strikes, people have turned to Mrs. Marcos for relief and assistance. This is not only because they know she has a compassionate heart but more because they are confident she would take action immediately. Not having a budget of her own to meet these numerous appeals for assistance, the First Lady started a Special Disaster Fund for victims of natural disasters. However, it is not financial aid alone that counts in moments of crisis. It is being there at the disaster site to commiserate with the victims and keeping vigil to boost the morale of the people as President and Mrs. Marcos have demonstrated in so many instances.

'MALIGAYANG PASKO' PROJECT

Annually, as the Christmas season draws near, the First Lady raises funds from the private sector to underwrite the traditional 'Maligayang Pasko' Festival. The climax of this Festival is the customary distribution of thousands of 'Maligayang Pasko' bags to indigent families in the slum areas of Manila and its suburbs.

Student leaders from different colleges and universities take charge of scouting the slum areas for deserving recipients of the bags. The experience helps to develop their social conscience as they gain insight into the plight of the poor. The students themselves distribute the bags that have been carefully packaged by members of the Ladies Volunteer Committee of Mrs. Marcos. Each bag, designed to spread Christmas cheer, contains a wide assortment of foodstuffs, clothing and other sundries.

Since 1968, the First Lady has made the Festival nationwide. This has involved raising ₱1.2 million yearly to provide 100,000 'Maligayang Pasko' bags for distribution in the 66 provinces. The children's Christmas party for the poor and youngsters from welfare institutions is another of the First Lady's undertakings during Christmas. Surplus funds raised during past Christmases have been channeled to the construction of parks and playgrounds in Manila and the neighboring cities of Pasay, Caloocan and Quezon.

PROJECT TULUNGAN

The First Lady's latest nationwide action program, Project Tulungan, has moved more deeply into impoverished areas of the country to advance the welfare of the less fortunate. This is being accomplished through self-help programs in health, social services, educational activities, housing, family life, education, vocational training and placement, recreation and continuing adult education.

Project Tulungan Centers are in full operation in Tondo, Manila's depressed area, where volunteers teach those who have less in life to improve the quality of their lives with dignity, pride and self-respect. The welfare project is not a charity program. Rather, it encourages the philanthropy of skills, funds and expertise from the government, the church and the private sector to help accelerate national progress. Project Tulungan calls for the highest ideals of humanitarianism and volunteerism equated only with the noblest demonstration of love for one's people and one's country.

All these social action programs coupled with the elevation to cabinet level of the Department of Social Welfare and the upgrading of social work as a profession have been regarded as a breakthrough in social welfare in the Philippines. More importantly, it has kept faith with President Marcos' belief that success in social action is essential to national progress.

There is no room for complacency in the crucial struggle

By CONRADO LORENZO JR.

MEETING THE POPULATION CHALLENGE



The Philippines with its present population of more than 37 million people is described as one of the fastest growing nations in the world, with an estimated rate of population growth of 3.2 per cent per year. If the population growth is not checked, the Philippines will be faced with the monumental problem of caring, housing, feeding and educating close to a hundred million people by the end of the century.

Recognizing the grave implications of this situation for the future of the nation, President Ferdinand E. Marcos created the Commission on Population on 19 February 1969.

The Commission recommended the following

policy elements to President Marcos:

1. to establish and adopt specific and quantitative population goals on the basis of reliable demographic data and expected demographic trends;

2. to promote the broadest understanding of the adverse effects on family life and national welfare of unlimited population growth and to provide the means by which couples can safely, effectively, and freely determine the proper size of their families;

3. to make family planning part of a broad educational program oriented toward the harmonious development of the individual personality, the family, and the nation;

4. to examine legal and administrative policies and measures to bring about a balance between family size and social and economic goals;

5. to continue efforts toward the further reduction of still high rates of morbidity and mortality;

6. to adopt policies and establish programs guiding and regulating the flow of internal migration, and influencing spatial distribution in the interest of development progress; and

7. to establish and maintain regular contact with international public and private organizations concerned with population problems.

The Commission's statement on population policy was approved by President Marcos on 6 December 1969. The statement has since been called by many authorities as "the best and wisest in the world".

THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION

The creation of the Commission on Population marked a new era in the population planning movement of the Philippines. Previously, population activities were carried out by a number of varied institutions which were autonomous, unrelated and self-determining. That such a situation then was not only beneficial but perhaps necessary is borne out by the remarkable and almost surprising amount of activity in population or family planning. However, the number of organizations and institutions involved in family planning has increased so quickly that a central, authoritative, coordinating body is needed to give the population movement the vital direction, supervision and management required to maximize at controlling population growth. Today, the Commission on Population assumes this vital role.

The Commission derives much of its strength and authority from its broad and multisectoral composition. It consists of the following members from the government, civic and religious sectors: the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of Health, the Secretary of Social Welfare, the Chairman of the National Economic Council, the Presidential Assistant on Community Development, the Chairman of the National Manpower & Youth

Council, the Commissioner on National Integration, the Director of the Bureau of Census & Statistics, the Director of the University of the Philippines Population Institute, the Director of the Philippine Press Institute, the Representative of the Asian Social Institute/Institute of Social Order, the President of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, the President of the Philippine Medical Association, the President of the Philippine Nurses Association, the President of the National League of Puericulture Centers, the President of the Family Planning Organization of the Philippines, the President of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, the President of the National Union of Students of the Philippines, the Executive Secretary of National Council of Churches, the Executive Director of Institute of Maternal and Child Health, the Executive Director of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, and the Director of the National Media Production Center.

On 1 July 1970, the office of the Commission set out to perform the following functions and duties laid down by Presidential Executive Order No. 233:

1. Formulate program recommendations on population as it relates to economic and social development consistent with and implementing the population policy approved by this Office on 4 December 1969;

2. Coordinate and evaluate the implementation of approved program recommendations and project proposals;



3. Undertake such action projects as are necessary;

4. Undertake, promote, and publish studies and investigations on the Philippine population in all its aspects;

5. Assemble and disseminate technical and scientific information relating to medical, social, economic and cultural phenomena as these affect or are affected by population;

6. Perform such other duties as proper authorities may from time to time direct the Commission to undertake.



FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS

The population/family planning program of the Philippines is probably the most unique in Asia. In sharp contrast to some of our neighboring countries, it is not a rigid and inflexible program; it is diverse and multi-sectoral. It underscores and respects the feeling and conviction of both acceptor and doctor. It goes on record as being definitely opposed to abortion as a method of fertility control. Today the Commission on Population coordinates and supervises 31 major projects which cover all the major disciplines of family planning—research and evaluation, training, clinic services and information/edu-

cation/communication. Seventeen of these projects are run by the government and fourteen by private organizations.

In a relatively short period of three years of organized efforts at family planning, we now have about 500 family planning clinics all over the country; 800 clinics have been programmed and are expected to be operational by the middle of next year. The majority of these clinics are run by private organizations. However, by the middle of next year, 300 of these clinics will be run by the government. Over this short period of time, we have documented about 250,000 acceptors. Only very recently our monthly acceptor rate has risen to 14,000 a month. Although it is too early to make any definite conclusion, the evidence seems to indicate that we are off to a very good start.

In the training and education field, the combined efforts of our government, the Family Planning Organization of the Philippines and the Institute of Maternal and Child Health have trained and fielded 7,132 doctors, 6,176 nurses, 2,769 midwives and 62 health educators.

In the research field, the government has embarked on a program to provide a computerized file on our acceptors and to provide a current progress-oriented reporting system on all our clinics. It has embarked on an important and vital program of improving our birth and death registration system. Aside from these broad demographic studies, basic research on female hormones and sociologic oriented programs are also underway.

In the information/education/communication field, equally exciting projects have been programmed by both the government and private sectors. Dissemination of family planning information through the mass media is underway. Carefully-designed large scale projects in motivation have been programmed by the Department of Social Welfare.

Despite encouraging signs, there is no room for complacency in the crucial struggle for population control. The population problem is a serious one, it is complex, it is real, it is here and it is here today. The Filipino people have responded to the challenge with conviction, dedication and a solemn sense of responsibility.

The new policy is one of self-reliance under a system of nation-states with conflicting interests By MANUEL COLLANTES

SHAPING A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

The world of the Seventies is vastly different from the world of the Forties or the decade of the Fifties. In 1941, at the outbreak of World War II, we were 19 million people. Today, we are almost 40 million people and a lot of changes have taken place on the national and world scenes. Post-war reconstruction in many parts of the world has been completed, and prosperity has been achieved in societies destroyed by the war. Modern technology has vastly improved the life of the peoples in such advanced societies as the United States, the U.S.S.R., Western Europe, Scandinavia, and Japan. The people's Republic of China has emerged as a nuclear power. A realignment of forces has taken place in the Western Alliance, and the once monolithic Communist force led by the U.S.S.R. is in disarray. Nationalism is on the rise in the countries of Eastern Europe.

Whereas in 1945, there were only 50 member-states in the United Nations and one nuclear power, today, membership in the United Nations has increased to 127 nations, and the United States no longer has a nuclear monopoly. While the superpowers race for the moon and into space and devote vast sums for the development of weapons of mass destruction, the peoples of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are engaged in another race: the race to achieve the good life and to complete the revolution of rising expectations.

Against this background of change in the



post-war years, the Filipino people have discovered that in the last analysis they must learn to fend for themselves. Having grown to maturity, they now demand fulfillment of their national aspirations and they see in nationalism the driving force or the means by which to achieve them.

In response to the changing character of the times and to the growing needs of the Filipino people, the Philippine Government under the leadership of President Marcos has enunciated a new foreign policy designed to advance the national interest and to promote the security, independence, and prosperity of the Filipino people.

The new foreign policy takes into account the realities of our times. More specifically,

it is a foreign policy that emphasizes our Asian relations. It is a policy committed to a readjustment of the Philippines' political, military and economic relations with the United States consistent with the sovereign interests of each. At the same time, in anticipation of the expiration in 1974 of parity and Philippines-U.S. economic agreements, the policy is one that seeks new markets abroad in addition to the traditional markets.

Freed from the constraints on our policy of the Forties and the Fifties, we have begun developing our ties with Asian neighbors on a bilateral and multilateral basis. We have relaxed our relations with Communist countries and allowed trade with them on an experimental, selective, chamber-to-chamber basis. We are re-examining our ties with traditional friends on the basis of mutual benefit. We have explored the possibilities of expanding our trade with Western Europe. We have normalized our relations with Japan and Malaysia.

In order to promote our friendship with our Asian neighbors as well as our common goals of nationhood, we have entered into various bilateral agreements with them and actively encouraged the establishment of regional and cultural schemes. Where the objectives of national growth are impeded, or are arrested for lack of resources, we recognize the merit of relying on regional economic cooperation to supplement the national effort at nation-building.

The new foreign policy, then, rests upon the need to secure the peace and well-being of the Filipino people. It is a policy of self-reliance which we recognize as a valid stance under a system of nation-states with conflicting interests. It recognizes that ideologies do exist but that ideologies are not necessarily barriers to cooperation or co-existence.

This is the innovative approach to Philippine foreign policy, as enunciated by President Marcos and as affirmed and implemented by Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo. We view the Seventies as a decade of opportunity as well as of peril. In an age when the alliances of both East and West have become fragmented, when the two super-powers have found it necessary to seek areas of accommodation, when, because of decolon-

ization, the West has withdrawn from Asia, when new forms of colonialism threaten the independence of countries, it is imperative that the Philippines pursue a policy committed to the highest ideals of nationhood. In pursuit of this policy, we have begun to realize anew the truth of the axiom that there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests.

We have shed off the pretense that the People's Republic of China does not exist. Towards the Socialist countries of Europe, we have opened trade relations in an exploratory spirit, hoping to widen such relations if cir-



cumstances permit.

In contemplating or taking these steps, however, we are not about to keep from one extreme of the political spectrum to the other in our desire to put our foreign relations on an even keel. Far from it. We seek merely to unshackle ourselves from the limiting and self-imposed restrictions which had unduly narrowed our horizon. We are moving perhaps not with great speed but with due deliberation.

Meanwhile, we have maintained our adherence to the principles of the United States Charter. In keeping with the changes in international politics and the demands of scores of nation-states in Asia and Africa, we seek a revision of the UN Charter in order to

strengthen the World Organization. We have joined the developing countries of the world in a common plea that the developed countries accord us opportunities for a life of dignity and relative affluence through non-reciprocal trade preferences and by allowing us to sell our semi-manufactured goods in their markets as well as to commit one per cent of their gross national product in assistance to the developing countries.

We continue to promote our relations with the new states of Asia and Africa, in the UN and outside. We have espoused the causes of decolonization and economic development. We are committed to the self-determination of peoples. We have joined the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the struggle against apartheid and all other forms of discrimination based on race and color. We are committed today, as in the past, to the promotion and advancement of human rights, whether it is in South Africa or in Angola, in Hungary or in Tibet.

In recognition of the changes that have taken place since the birth of the United Nations 25 years ago, President Marcos in a policy address before the General Assembly in 1966 called for a review of the UN Charter. In this the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, General Romulo, chairman of the Philippine delegation, has reiterated the President's proposal for a review of the Charter so that it will "reflect faithfully the realities and the vital needs of this new world." The Philippines accordingly has proposed the establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the Review of the Charter whose terms of reference cover three main categories of constitutional changes: functional, political, and economic and social.

We want a United Nations in which the hopes of mankind for a just peace are secure, a U.N. with an effective peace-keeping machinery, a U.N. in which the problem of population explosion is effectively controlled and man can live "with reasonable order, decency and dignity," a U.N. which can help effectively in bridging the poverty gap.

The decade of the Seventies has been aptly described by General Romulo as "a danger-

ous decade," because of three dangers: "the danger of international respect for human rights becoming unenforceable; the danger of the poverty gap becoming unbridgeable, and the danger of the nuclear arms race becoming uncontrollable." Hence, we have supported proposals for disarmament and for the re-channelling of the financial resources that go to armament. We are at the same time an active supporter of the objectives of the Second Development Decade.

The Philippines, along with the "Group of 77" developing countries, which have since expanded in number, has called upon the developed countries of the world to accept the principles of the Charter of Algiers by a voluntary transfer of resources, by meeting the target dates for the easing of onerous terms of aid, and by adopting measures for eliminating trade barriers and giving developing countries wider access to markets in the industrialized countries.

The Philippines realizes that no economic development plan can prosper in a climate of conflict. We are, therefore, affirming the U.N. principle of settling disputes between nations through peaceful means. This is in fact the rationale of the proposal of President Marcos for an Asian Forum in which disputes among Asian countries can be discussed before they develop into a shooting war.

But while there are dangers in the Seventies, it is also a decade of opportunity. Of necessity, countries like the Philippines must make it a decade of opportunity. The present foreign policy of the Philippines is committed to turning that opportunity into reality. We are at the crossroads of change; it behooves us to make friends with nations which wish us no harm and which believe like us in the validity of conducting relations on the basis of mutual benefit and respect. In this period of transition and growth, the Filipino people are engaged in a search for the national identity. More than ever before, they have become aware of the conflicts of our times, of the shifts in relations among nations, of the fact that life can be better and that they have it in their hands to make it so.

It is in this light that the imperatives of the present Philippine foreign policy must be viewed.

THE MYTH OF CRISIS

The typical view of the Philippines is that of a land on the verge of revolution. Crime is rampant; corruption is endemic; armed dissidents are in control of the countryside; the economy is suffering from grievous mismanagement and therefore stagnant if not retrogressive; unemployment is soaring; and popular discontent is very near explosion point.

Such a view is held not merely by the "irresponsible" segments of the press; they are accepted, in greater or lesser degree, by scholars and experts. Typical of the latter is the otherwise percipient student of Asian affairs, Mr. Edwin O. Reischauer. "The situation (as regards internal stability) is particularly critical in the Philippines," writes Mr. Reischauer. "Unsatisfactory economic growth, mounting corruption, increasing lawlessness, and declining morale all spell trouble."

Although this has not gone unchallenged, the difficulty is that critics and defenders alike argue on a highly impressionistic basis, accepting as facts a multiplicity of data arrived at by mere intuition.

In January 1970, the RAND Corporation made public a study of the popular beliefs regarding the Philippines in order to establish their truth or lack of truth.

Among many others, the question which RAND proposed answer is as follows: Are these views correct?

RAND's reply is: No.

The Philippines is by no means a land of Cockaigne, but it is not worse off, and indeed is appreciably better, than other developing countries in a similar stage of development.

In the following pages, *The Philippines Quarterly* reprints the major findings of the RAND Corporation.

The prevailing popular view of the Philippines is that the country suffers from unsatisfactory economic growth, increasing crime and corruption, a menacing insurgency, and irrelevant politics. Given the perception of so many ills, it is little wonder that the stability of Philippine democracy has been called into question. . . .

We have found that despite much of the bleak view mounting, the economy is growing respectably, and the policy appears stable. This does not mean, however, that the Philippines is performing spectacularly or that it has no problems.

CRIME IN THE PHILIPPINES

The image of the Philippines as a failing democracy rests heavily on the country's image as a society plagued by mounting crime. Perceptions of a crime wave in the Philippines, however, rest on erroneous estimates of national crime rates. Between 1962 and 1965 estimates of all crime rates were

seriously understated. In 1966 estimates free of arithmetic error were spliced to the old understated rates, thereby creating an arithmetically induced crime wave. Furthermore, beginning in 1966 the Philippine government began a major campaign to improve crime reporting. It is impossible to correct the crime rates for all resulting improvements in reporting, but much of the measured increase in crime rates can be attributed to a few areas where Philippine police agencies were extremely active.

Apparent large increase in the national murder-homicide rates can be traced to large upswing of reported murders and homicides in Manila and Rizal province, not to a general rise in violence. In fact, the image of the Philippines as a crime-ridden country rests mainly on the high violence rates. International comparisons suggest that the Philippines does have a very high violence rate, but its reported theft and robbery rates are lower than those of the United States. The crisis of crime has been overstated. It is Greater Manila that has a crime problem. Our analysis suggests the high violence rates are partly based on ethnic propensities that are very hard to change in the short run. Some violence appears to be related to political rivalries and feuds. In urban areas high crime rates appear to be related to urban economic growth and concentration. This may have resulted from the inadvertent concentration of economic activity during the period 1948-1960. Our analysis suggests that for urban areas, the inputs of police resources do not result in higher arrest rates. Nor do arrest rates seem particularly related to crime rates. Police inputs in cities seem to be related only to each other.

Crime and concern about it are not uniformly distributed across the country. In Manila, survey data show that crime is rated the number one problem. In other parts of the country crime ranks substantially below other problems.

The great variation in crime rates—especially violence rates—across Philippine provinces and cities needs to be explained. In provinces we can trace a cycle of violence that is closely related to the occurrence of elections. Violence tends to peak at election years with the highest peaks occurring in Presidential

election years. This political violence seems to be directed at specific members of political factions rather than the population as a whole, since people in these politically violent areas say their barrios are relatively peaceful.

The analysis suggests that crime has been overstated as a Philippine crisis. Violence rates, although high overall, do not appear to be rising. Furthermore, violence is concentrated in a few areas of the country.

DISSIDENCE

Along with crime, the problem of dissidence is again seen as threatening the Philippines. Dissidence and insurgency are hardly new. The Philippines has a long history of dissident movements forming, becoming active, and then receding. The modern nation, however, has had no instance of a successful revolution. Many believe the nation came close to revolution during the Hukbalahap (Huk) uprising of 1949-1953. Foreigners, impressed by analogies to Vietnam, believe that the contemporary Huks pose a similar revolutionary threat. The driving force behind this threat is often seen as discontent arising from bad land tenure arrangements.

The Philippine government seems to believe that its dissidence problem is partly social and partly a problem for the constabulary and the military. Give either or both interpretations, the problem often seems intractable. If dissidence arises because of a bad land tenure system, reform will be very difficult because of bureaucratic and legal constraints. If dissidence is a straightforward police and military problem, political constraints make it hard to act. The Huks, unlike insurgent organizations elsewhere, are actively involved in the legitimate political life of Central Luzon.

The problem of Huk control can be analyzed in two different ways—by examining survey data concerning the image of the Huks and the government, particularly in Central and Southern Luzon, and by building statistical models of control and operations. The results of fitting statistical models at municipal and barrio levels suggest that the dissidence in Central Luzon feeds on terror and coercion rather than on the popular discontent im-

puted to tenants. Tenants have no more favorable image of the Huks than non-tenant Pampangan have no more favorable view of the Huk than other language groups. Our survey data also suggest that respondents in the Huk areas do not view the government in any worse light than other groups.

Terror and violence may explain Huk control; but the purpose of the Huks remain ambiguous. Captured documents and interviews with Huk prisoners suggest that the organization is politically motivated, more specifically is Communist in nature. Other interviews suggest that some factions among the Huks are motivated primarily by personal gain.

Even if there were signals of widespread discontent that we have missed and if this were a precondition of insurgency, the Huks do not appear to be an organization that could mobilize and exploit that area. They appear to be indolent and poorly organized. On the other hand they are likely to remain a major nuisance.

POLITICS AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

Arguments that the Philippines is a nation in crisis often relate mounting crime and threatening insurgency to alleged poor performance of the political system. Critics argue that politics in the Philippines is noisy and irrelevant and that the common man is disillusioned and eager for a revolutionary alternative. We have seen that the common perceptions of crime and dissidence in the Philippines are inaccurate. Likewise, perceptions of the Philippine polity as unresponsive and unstable also appear to be unfounded.

Filipinos believe the government has a positive impact on their lives. In 1969, 46 percent of the Filipinos believed that the national government improves conditions, 35 percent believed that the government makes no difference, and 7 percent believed they would be better off without the national government. Such figures for a less-developed country compare favorably with responses from other countries. For example, in Mexico in 1963 only 18 percent of the people believed that the national government improved conditions while 67 percent believed the government made no difference to their lives. Sim-

ilarly, the Philippines compares well with the developed democracies in the perception of equal treatment: 42 percent of the Filipinos expect equal treatment, 35 percent do not; 23 percent don't know. For context, in 1963, 53 percent of the Italians and 42 percent of the Mexicans expected equal treatment.

In a political system in which the people's preferences count, minimal requirements for stability would include a widespread perception that the performance of the government is not outrageously deficient or inequitable and a degree of congruence between the views of public and politicians. These conditions appear to be met in the Philippines.

It is hard to find groups of voters that are strongly discontented or demanding a more issue-oriented politics. The poor, the young, and tenants—groups we might expect to be different—appear not to differ from the rest of the population. In general, all groups prefer honesty, pork barrel, and a candidate who speaks their dialect. No group appears to be demanding a different kind of politics. Without such a general demand the stability of the system is unlikely to be threatened. Without such a demand, however, it is also difficult for the politician to be an innovator.

These results indicate more political stabil-



ity in the Philippines than casual observation or the press would suggest. Filipino views of government performance compare favorably with those found in developed countries. Demands for fundamental change are

hard to find. Politicians perceive the wishes of their constituents accurately and try to fulfill them. This view of stability is buttressed by the election of 1969 — which occurred after our major analysis was completed—in which voters re-elected an incumbent President for the first time.

The country appears to be politically stable. That stability rests in a rural sector voting along traditional lines with politician responding primarily to rural demands. The only group of voters we found that is relatively less oriented to traditional political behavior is the emerging modern labor force. It is growing fast, appears somewhat discontented with the current political system. The urban voter might welcome appeals for modernization and appeals to his economic interests.

THE ECONOMY

The image of the Philippines as a nation muddling along in the face of crisis is drawn at least as much from dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy as it is from criticism to the political system. Evidence of crisis is seen in high unemployment, an unsatisfactory and uneven rate growth of GNP, and the periodic balance of payments difficulties. In the face of these problems, critics charge the Philippine government with hesitation and vacillation.


The perceptions of economic crisis, however, are inaccurate. This point can be dem-

onstrated if one examine information on the economy in detail, going behind the aggregates on which the usual evaluations are based. Viewed closely, unemployment, the rate of growth, and the unevenness of growth appear quite different from their image in the rhetoric of crisis.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The “unemployment crisis” in the Philippines is a constantly recurring theme. Every President since Magsaysay has expressed deep concern over the “ominously serious” proportions of the unemployment problem and has addressed some action toward alleviating it. In the rhetoric, Philippine unemployment is seen as a widespread and pervasive problem, with the unemployed tramping the streets vainly seeking work and farmers locked into debilitating idleness between planting and harvest.

This image of general crisis is inaccurate. Unemployment is in fact a very specific problem, concentrated among young people looking for their first regular jobs. Over half of all unemployed fall into this category, which represents only five per cent of the total labor force. We find that for this group, and possibly for other groups as well, the concepts of “unemployment” and “labor force” are quite ambiguous. Half of the inexperienced unemployed say they would like a job but believe none are available. This is the extent of their participation in the labor force. Many pass



into and out of this part of the "labor force" without ever finding a job, moving presumably to marriage, housework, or school.

Underemployment is similarly elusive. The typical "underemployed" Filipino is already working 40 or more hours per weeks. Of those working less than 20 hours per week and wanting more work, half are rural females.

Although unemployment as measured by official definition does not appear to be a widespread and mounting problem, something called "unemployment" is seen by politicians as an important political issue. Survey data showed that many Filipinos who presumably would not qualify as unemployed by the official definition consider themselves unemployed. It is this group to whom we should look for evidence of alienation or dissatisfaction with the "system". However, the opinions of the *self-perceived* unemployed seem to be much like the opinions of the rest of the population. They are even more favorable toward the government and politicians, and they vote more traditionally.

STAGNATION

The second major economic issue is the rate growth of GNP. Judgment that the Philippine economy is only a mediocre performer are usually based on the rate of growth shown in the national accounts. Critiques of Philippine national accounting procedure by various scholars suggest that estimates of GNP and its rate of growth are likely to be biased downward.

To check the rate at which the Philippine economy is modernizing, we compiled measures of the "modern labor force" (MLF), by which we mean essentially those workers in non-craft manufacturing plus those who support the non-craft manufacturing sector in transportation, power generation, mining, and the like. The definition of MLF corresponds to workers performing modern activities with relatively large amounts of capital in identifiable establishments.

Our estimates of MLF show an increase from 1 million in 1960 to 1.7 million in 1968, an annual rate of growth of 6.8 per cent. By this measure, economic modernization has been substantial. The data on the MLF over

time suggest that in the period 1948-1961 the economy became more concentrated. Measured as a percentage of the population over 20 years of age, the modern labor force declined in most provinces. Growth of the modern labor force was concentrated in only a few provinces, principally Manila, Rizal, and Bulacan. The concentration in the Manila area may have been the result of the need to bargain with bureaucrats for foreign exchange allocations and to locate near the modern infrastructure. This pattern of concentration apparently reversed itself between 1960 and 1968. There was an increase in the percentage of modern labor force in 41 provinces.

THE LURCHING ECONOMY

Although it appears to be modernizing rapidly, the Philippine economy has been rather unstable. The rate of growth, at least until 1966, moved in a two-year cycle. Foreign exchange crises recurred with distressing frequency. The lurches in the growth rate and recurring crises tended to obscure the real progress of the Philippine economy and bred pessimism about the country's long run prospects.

The uneven performance is related to the politician's need to deliver pork barrel to win elections. The government deficit has followed a two-year cycle, increasing in election years, falling in non-election years. These cycles in fiscal policy could have been offset by the Central Bank. However, the bank, *according to its own evaluations of monetary policy*, has tended to move with rather than against the fiscal cycle. The net impact of policy has thus fluctuated annually from expansion to restraint and back to expansion.

If the uneven performance of the Philippine economy is rooted in the functioning of the political system, no one should be surprised and disturbed when a foreign exchange crisis occurs. The crises are not evidence of fundamental disequilibrium.

CONCLUSIONS

Any sensible evaluation of the Philippines should consider the following points:

1. The crisis of crime has been overstated. It is Greater Manila that has a crime pro-

blem. Our analysis suggest that the high violence rates are partly based on ethnic propensities that are very hard to change in the short run. Some violence appears to be related to political rivalries and feuds. In urban areas high crime rates appear to be related to urban economic growth and concentration. This may have resulted from the inadvertent concentration of economic activity during the period 1948-1960.

2. Huk dissidence is a major nuisance. However, it does not appear to pose a revolutionary threat to the government. It is very difficult to find large-scale popular support for the Huks even in their home areas. They should not be characterized as having the single objective of overthrowing the government. In fact, the organization works with and through local politicians. It does not behave like a classical insurgent organization nor does it have the effectiveness of the early Viet Cong. Part of the organization appears motivated by personal gain, part by political ideology.

3. The country appears to be politically stable. That stability rests in a rural sector voting along traditional lines with politicians responding primarily to rural demands.

4. The Philippine people, by their voting behavior, in a sense have revealed their preference for the kind of economic performance they are getting. To an outside observer an

economy that lurches every two years may be unhealthy. Balance of payments crises in particular disturb international agencies with whom the Philippines deals. To the extent that we can determine, however, Philippine decision makers have sufficient flexibility to deal with more acute crises.

THE PHILIPPINES is not a nation in crisis.

How can it be that the usual image of the Philippines differ so sharply from that presented above? In part, at least, the conventional view seems to arise from the application to the Philippines of a metaphorical view of LDCs. We might call it the metaphor of the peasant society. The people in LDCs are seen as simple, long-suffering peasants without means of influencing their leaders. Frustrated, they become dissidents and insurgents. At the same time, at the top of society, a relatively homogeneous elite is perceived making decisions in its own interest, thereby compromising the national interest. The economies of the LDCs are also seen as simple two-sector affairs where the problem is managing the transition from an essentially rural labor force to an urban one. We have seen good reason to question this entire metaphor for the Philippines, and there is good reason to question it in other LDCs. The Philippine economy and polity are complex. The use of the "classical" metaphor simply misleads us. ●



Social change and unremitting dynamism exert great pressure on the lives of the people

By EFREN PLANA

PEACE AND ORDER

The little tale about a Filipino worker abroad who returned to the country on home leave to find out for himself how true were reports about the Philippines being a "crime-ridden" place as portrayed in the local and foreign press, is typical of countless others who returned with the same apprehensions and discovered an altogether different—and more pleasant—picture.

This particular Filipino, as soon as he was settled in Manila, immediately set out on a personal quest that was to bring him into what were reported as the "sin" places and other tourist traps posing the greatest danger not only to the pocketbook but to life and limb as well. His findings: despite the prominence given by newspapers to crime news, the so-called city of thugs, on balance, does not exist; what does exist is a generally peaceful but throbbing and vibrant city seeking its rightful place in the mainstream of universal progress; peopled by hardworking souls and certainly not fallen angels living beyond the fringes of man's or God's laws.

This particular Filipino has since then decided to stay in the Philippines—for good.

A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

The peace and order situation in the Philippines may be viewed as a social phenomenon that increases in intensity and magnitude as society becomes a complex organism; as population increases; as peoples of varied customs and traditions, of differing sensibility and calling, mingle and live together.

These changes create not only the so-called

revolution of rising expectations or of conditions for better material life; they also create social problems, social disruptions, among them criminality and juvenile delinquency.

Viewed in this light, criminality in the Philippines is part of a worldwide phenomenon in which the same conditions of social growth and complexity occur and impinge upon the lives of people.

MAJOR DETERRENT

Crime may be said to have a built-in check in the very structure of Philippine society itself, which is anchored upon a deep religiousness among the people.

This single factor, which signifies that reverence for life is living faith, deters the growth of social malaise, including vicious politics and power confrontations that even now grip other peoples. According to a noted social scientist, B. M. Pascual:

"More than any other influence, it is probably the spiritual strength given to a man that makes him resist evil stoutly, whatever temptation may come his way. A poor man does not really have to embrace a life of crime in order to be able to taste a life of comfort. Even a hardened criminal still has that tiny voice, the whisper of God, in his conscience that can draw away a life of violence. Even politicians need not have to resort to Machiavellian duplicity and violence in order to be able to gain hold of the reins of power. And once they attain political

glory, they do not have to be a Cesare Borgia or maintain a condottiere in order to keep themselves on the saddle. Indeed politics and Christianity are not incompatible; economic well-being can go hand in hand with religiosity; and a life of violence can still transform itself into a life of Christian usefulness."

AMONG THE LOWEST IN THE WORLD

It is perhaps for this reason that the crime rate in the Philippines, despite sensationalized crime news, remains among the lowest in the world.

According to official sources, crime in the United States, for example, has increased by 58 per cent since 1968; Canada by 16 per cent from 1962 to 1965; Sweden by 39 per cent from 1960 to 1965; and France by 44 per cent for theft alone (crime against property) in 1965; India by 37 per cent in 1963; Hongkong by 20 per cent in 1965; South Korea by 12 per cent on index crimes for every 100,000 inhabitants in 1964; Malaysia by 61 per cent on index crimes in 1964; and 22 per cent for India on index crimes also in 1964.

In sharp contrast, a study of the crime rate in the Philippines shows a relatively minimal increase of eight per cent in the mid-sixties.

THE MARCOS APPROACH

Notwithstanding the relatively low crime rate, the present administration is viewing the problem with concern, and has therefore opted for a practical and lasting approach to the crime problem.

This approach involves the improvement in the capability for crime prevention in the conviction that "an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure"; the improvement of the machinery for law enforcement, and the improvement in the administration of justice.

On the improvement of the capability for crime prevention, the present administration has modernized police equipment, upgraded local police forces as well as the national police which is the Philippine Constabulary, and removed misfits and undesirables in the service.

Moreover, schools for policemen have been set up—the first in Philippine police history.

SCHOOLS FOR POLICEMEN

The Police Academy is now in full operational capacity in Fort Bonifacio. Five other police academies have since then been established in Cebu, Cagayan de Oro, Tarlac, Bacolod, and Lingayen.

Overseeing these academies is the Police Commission headed by Retired Brig. Gen. Crispino de Castro as chairman.

Thus far, these academies have conducted numerous courses for chiefs of police, deputy chiefs of police and other intermediate-rank police officers.

Aside from these courses, a crash training program initiated in 1968 has been offered to policemen in the lower grades as well as recruits, not to mention the chairmen and members of local boards of investigators, as a means of systematizing investigation procedures in administrative cases.

Right now, it is heartening to note that the present administration plans to train 1,000 policemen for each quarter of the year—with the number programmed for further increases in the immediate future.

Hand in hand with this upgrading program is the drive against misfits and undesirables in police forces. In the calendar year just ended, the Police Commission dismissed 101 policemen with prejudice, suspended 21 others, reprimanded eight in 239 cases acted upon by the police body.

What is heartening to note is that we now have a police body that will receive and act on the complaints of citizens against unscrupulous or erring members of police forces throughout the country. Aside from disciplining members of police forces, the Police Commission has also restored the people's confidence in established authority.

POLICE EQUIPMENT MODERNIZED

The present administration has also modernized police equipment, with the amount of ₱10 million initially released for the purpose.

Moreover, a Metropol Communications Network has been established, linking five cities and nine first-class municipalities in Greater Manila area.

At the same time, a number of municipalities in Rizal (the most populated province in the Philippines) have been provided by the

national government with modern communications system. Ten other major provinces have already been surveyed for installation of needed communications equipment.

As for the Philippine Constabulary, which remains the national police, a program for the modernization of its equipment as well as the upgrading of individual members have been stepped up since 1967.

At present, every member of the Philippine Constabulary is being trained in the detection, prevention, and investigation of crimes as well as the prosecution of criminal cases in court.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

In the administration of justice, the national government is striving hard to facilitate easy access to the courts and ensure equality before the law.

The government has accelerated the pace of the judicial processes and modernized court administration with the use of computers in keeping track of criminal offenses.

Moreover, procedural reforms have been instituted to decongest court dockets by equalizing the caseloads in municipal courts and by speeding up the prosecution of criminal cases.

For this purpose, the government has organized 16 criminal circuit courts, a step which resulted in positive disposal ratios by all other courts, including the Courts of First Instance. To gauge its success, more cases were disposed of than cases filed for the same period. The overall percentage ratio of cases filed in all these courts is an outstanding 71 per cent, almost twice the average ratio in 1968 for the regular Courts of First Instance.

NEW LAWS IMPLEMENTED

The national government, through the courts and other agencies, has implemented a number of laws to improve its peace-and-order drive.

The government has implemented Republic Act 6033, which gave preference to criminal cases involving indigent or poor families.

Another law, Republic Act 6034 has also been implemented. This law gives travelling and other allowances to indigent litigants and witnesses for attending court hearings.

Still another law implemented was Republic Act 6035, which provided free transcripts

of stenographic notes to low-income parties in judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative cases.

Republic Act 6036, which dispensed with the requirement of bail, subject to certain exceptions, has also been implemented, resulting in the easing of cases and relieving the burdens of parties concerned. This law affects cases involving minor offenses and violations of city or municipal ordinances.

PRISON REFORMS

No field is overlooked in the drive against criminality, not even penal colonies or penitentiaries.

For this reason, the national government has launched a food self-sufficiency program in the penal colonies of Iwahig, Davao, and Sablayan; dispersed prisoners to outlying colonies; and encouraged the development of prison industries such as electronics, carpentry, and handicraft.

ANTI-DISSIDENT POLICY

In the drive against dissidents and subversives, the national government is pursuing a policy of attraction to lawless elements coupled with a policy of firmness.

On one hand, the government is pushing through various national social and economic development projects in Central Luzon and in other dissident-infested areas. Massive infrastructure projects and community development projects are being implemented in these areas to improve the people's social and economic conditions.

At the same time, the national government through the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Barrio Self-Defense Units are maintaining vigilance in the areas concerned to secure residents against the terroristic acts of these dissidents.

A VIABLE PROGRAM

The peace-and-order drive of the government is a priority program which has since then borne fruitful results.

The Philippines still enjoys one of the lowest crime rates in the world—a record by itself, considering that the country is a developing country where social change and unremitting dynamism exert the greatest pressure on the lives of the people.

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